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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 8 SUMMER 1980 NUMBER 3
TORT INDEMNITY IN FLORIDA
GERALD T. WETHERINGTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
One way for a defendant who is sued for damages in a tort action
to avoid sustaining a loss resulting from his liability to the plaintiff
is to successfully assert a claim against another party for indem-
nity. The law of indemnity allows a defendant held liable in tort
for damages to obtain reimbursement for his loss from another
party. Accordingly, an attorney who represents a defendant in a
tort action should always consider whether the client has a valid
claim for indemnity. This determination requires a detailed knowl-
edge of the law of indemnity.
Last year, the Florida Supreme Court decided two cases which
have a profound and far-reaching impact on the law of indemnity
in Florida. In Houdaille Industries, Inc. v. Edwards1 the court
held that a tortfeasor who is personally at fault in any way in caus-
ing injury to a third person will be denied common law indemnity.
This decision changes the prior law. Before 1979, a tortfeasor could
recover common law indemnity even though at fault in causing in-
juries to a third person, although only in limited circumstances to
be discussed below.
In the companion case to Houdaille, Charles Poe Masonry, Inc.
v. Spring Lock Scaffolding Rental Equipment Co., the Florida
Supreme Court held that an indemnity agreement will not be con-
strued to confer the right to indemnity against damages caused by
the indemnitee's own tortious conduct, unless the inient to provide
such indemnity is stated in "clear and unequivocal" language in
the indemnity agreement.
* Circuit Judge of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida; B.A.
1959, University of Miami; J.D. 1963, Duke University.
1. 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979).
2. 374 So. 2d 487, 489 (Fla. 1979). The court extended its earlier holding in University
Plaza Shopping Center, Inc. v. Stewart, 272 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1973). In University Plaza, the
Florida Supreme Court held that an indemnification agreement would not be construed to
provide indemnity against an indemnitee's sole negligence unless the intent to provide such
indemnity was expressed in clear and unequivocal language in the agreement. Id. at 511-12.
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The purpose of this article is to analyze the impact of these two
important cases cases on the Florida law of tort indemnity and to
discuss the basic principles of tort indemnity in Florida and in
other jurisdictions. This analysis will include not only an evalua-
tion of common law and contractual indemnity in Florida as modi-
fied by the Houdaille and Spring Lock decisions, it will also in-
clude an analysis of (1) statutory alterations of the Florida law of
tort indemnity; (2) the right of the indemnitee to recover attor-
ney's fees and costs as part of his damages in an indemnity action;
(3) the principles of pleading indemnity; (4) third party practice
involving indemnity claims and the effect of a judgment or settle-
ment in the injured third party's action; and (5) the statute of lim-
itations for indemnity claims.
II. COMMON LAW INDEMNITY
A. General Background
In the law of torts, numerous rules have developed which en-
hance a plaintiff's chances of. recovery for his injuries by extending
liability to more than one defendant.' Many examples of these
rules exist: the rule which makes an employer liable for injuries
caused by the negligence of his employee,' the rule which imposes
joint and several liability on concurrently negligent tortfeasors who
cause a single, indivisible injury,' the rule which holds both a re-
tailer and a manufacturer responsible for injuries caused by a de-
fectively manufactured product,' and the rule which places liabil-
ity on a party owing a nondelegable duty to prevent injuries caused
by the negligence of an independent contractor hired to perform
3. The common law extension of liability to more than one defendant has been discussed
in numerous articles, e.g., Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors (pt. 1),
21 CoRNnL L.Q. 552 (1936); Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors (pt.
2), 22 CORNELL L.Q. 69 (1937); Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Pro-
posed Rationale, 37 IOWA L. Rav. 517 (1952); Keeton, Contribution and Indemnity Among
Tortfeasors, 27 INS. COUNSEL J. 630 (1960); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between
Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. Rzv. 130 (1932); Meriam & Thornton, Indemnity Between Tort-
feasors: An Evolving Doctrine in the New York Court of Appeals, 25 N.Y.U. L. REv. 845
(1950); Walkowiak, Implied Indemnity: A Policy Analysis of the Total Loss Shifting Rem-
edy in a Partial Loss Shifting Jurisdiction, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 501 (1978); Comment, Con-
tribution and Indemnity in California, 57 CAL. L. Rav. 490 (1969); Note, Contribution and
Indemnity Between Joint Tortfeasors, 45 HAnv. L. REv. 349 (1931).
4. See Varnes v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 86 So. 433 (Fla. 1920).
5. See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Allen, 65 So. 8 (Fla. 1914).
6. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
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the nondelegable duty.'
In each of the above examples, the plaintiff may elect to seek
recovery for his total damages from only one of the responsible de-
fendants. If the plaintiff is successful in this endeavor, one defen-
dant will pay the entire loss even though other responsible defen-
dants contributed by their tortious conduct to causing it. The
defendant who shoulders the entire loss will naturally wish to shift
part or all of that loss to other responsible defendants. "Contribu-
tion" is the principle of law which allows one defendant to shift a
part of his loss to other responsible defendants. The principle of
law which allows one defendant to shift his entire loss to other
responsible defendants is called "indemnity."'
Common law indemnity, as distinguished from contractual in-
demnity, is created by law without regard to the actual consent of
the parties. As stated by Professor Leflar:
The right to indemnity may arise from a contract, .... Other
types of the right to indemnity are commonly called quasi con-
tractual, or arising out of a "contract implied by law." Indemnity
between persons liable for a tort falls within this type of case. As
between such persons, the obligation to indemnify is not a con-
sensual one; it is based altogether upon the law's notion- influ-
7. See Mastrandrea v. J. Mann, Inc., 128 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
8. The distinction between contribution and indemnity was elevated to constitutional
significance in Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Smith, 359 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1978), where the
court held that the tort exemption provision of Florida Workmen's Compensation Act, ch.
17481 § 11, 1935 Fla. Laws 1462 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1979)), was consti-
tutional in barring third party claims for contribution against employers under the recently
enacted Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, ch. 75-108, 1975 Fla. Laws 205 (cur-
rent version at FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1979)). The court in an earlier decision had held that
the same tort exemption provision was unconstitutional in barring third party claims for
indemnity against employers. Sunspan Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co.,
310 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1975). The court's definition of contribution and indemnity is therefore
particularly authoritative. The court stated:
Initially, it is pertinent to observe that there is a clear distinction between the
common law right of indemnity and the present, and relatively new, remedy of
contribution. This distinction is highly pertinent in the consideration of the equal
protection argument of appellant. Indemnity-or the right to assert it-is founded
on express or implied contract, upon the breach of some duty owed the party
seeking indemnity by the underwriter or upon the character of the conduct as
between the two.
Contribution was unknown to the common law. It is a statutory recognition of
the common liability of multiple tortfeasors to the injured party. The statute
provides for a distribution of that liability among the wrongdoers. In contrast to
indemnity, contribution does not rest on the legal relationship between the
tortfeasors.
359 So. 2d at 428-29 (footnotes omitted)(emphasis in original).
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enced by an equitable background-of what is fair and proper be-
tween the parties .... The quasi contractual idea of unjust
enrichment of course underlies any holding that one who has
been compelled in discharging his own legal obligation to pay off
a claim which in fairness and good conscience should be paid by
another can secure reimbursement from that other.9
1. The Contributory Negligence and No Contribution Rules
Common law indemnity developed in Florida and in many other
jurisdictions in conjunction with the rules of law which prevented a
plaintiff who was contributorily negligent from recovering any
damages for his injuries, and which also prevented contribution be-
tween defendants whose fault contributed to causing a plaintiff's
indivisible injuries. An understanding of common law indemnity
requires an understanding of the interplay among these three rules
of law.
Scholars have identified several major factors which persuaded
American courts to develop the doctrine that the contributory neg-
ligence of the plaintiff was a complete defense to his claim for
damages. First, the principle of fault, upon which the doctrine of
contributory negligence is based, was given prominent recognition
in the nineteenth century as one means of keeping the tort liability
of growing industry within bounds.10
Second, the doctrine of contributory negligence reflected the in-
dividualistic attitude of the common law as reflected in the often-
utilized moral maxim that each person should exercise care and
prudence in his or her individual affairs." Judicial acceptance of
the contributory negligence defense as a complete bar to a plain-
tiff's claim for injuries was fostered by other factors as well, such
as (1) a desire to control what the courts perceived to be plaintiff-
minded juries, 2 (2) a "[sicholastic urge to find a single proximate
cause" of an accident,'" and (3) the failure of the common law to
develop an acceptable method of apportioning damages where the
plaintiff sustained a single, indivisible injury."
9. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130, 146-
47 (1932)(footnotes omitted).
10. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 65 (4th ed. 1971); James, Contribu-
tory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 695-96 (1953).
11. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 65.
12. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L. REv. 151, 151
(1946).
13. James, supra note 10, at 696.
14. Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 GEo. L.J. 674, 709 (1934).
TORT INDEMNITY
The principle that a plaintiff's fault justifies denying his recover-
ing was accompanied by a corollary doctrine that a defendant's
fault also justifies denial of contribution among joint tortfeasors.
The rule that there can be no contribution between joint
tortfeasors had its origin in Merryweather v. Nixan,5 where the
defendants had acted intentionally and in concert, leading the
court to hold that contribution would be denied to a deliberate
wrongdoer. Although early American cases limited the Merry-
weather rule to cases of willful misconduct, the great majority of
courts soon extended the rule to deny contribution between negli-
gent tortfeasors not acting in concert where their negligence never-
theless concurred to cause a single, indivisible injury.' 6 Dean Pros-
ser attributed this change in judicial attitude to a lapse in judicial
reasoning caused by the adoption of procedural rules allowing con-
currently negligent tortfeasors to be joined in the same action.1 7 It
is possible, however, that the contributory negligence doctrine was
the more fundamental reason. To have allowed contribution be-
tween concurrently negligent tortfeasors while denying plaintiffs a
comparative fault doctrine would have been inconsistent and
would have thereby weakened the rationale for making contribu-
tory negligence a complete defense.'1 This is probably one reason
why insurance companies have often opposed the adoption of stat-
utes allowing contribution among tortfeasors."9 The interplay be-
tween the rules of contributory negligence and contribution be-
tween joint tortfeasors was demonstrated dramatically in Florida,
where the legislature adopted a contribution statute0 within three
15. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799). For a discussion of the Merryweather case see W. PROS-
SEE, supra note 10, at § 50. See also Great A & P Tea Co. v. Federal Detective Agency, Inc.,
157 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963)(indemnity denied to a tortfeasor who author-
ized and ratified the institution of a malicious prosecution).
16. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 65. The Restatement of Restitution adopted the no
contribution rule and stated that the rule was "explainable only on historical grounds." RE-
STATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 102, Comment a (1937).
17. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 50.
18. As the Florida Supreme Court has stated: "There is no equitable justification for
recognizing the right of the plaintiff to seek recovery on the basis of apportionment of fault
while denying the right of fault allocation as between negligent defendants." Lincenberg v.
Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 391 (Fla. 1975).
19. W. PRossER, supra note 10, at § 50. See the insurance industry's mimeographed
pamphlet which excoriates a tentative draft of the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act, reprinted in part in James, Replication, 54 HARv. L. Rxv. 1178, 1180 n.5 (1941).
Substantial opposition from some defendants led the United States Supreme Court to retain
the no contribution rule in admiralty. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Erie Lackawanna R.R.,
406 U.S. 340 (1972).
20. Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, ch. 75-108, 1975 Fla. Laws 205
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years after the Florida Supreme Court judicially abolished the con-
tributory negligence doctrine in favor of a comparative negligence
rule.21
2. Common Law Indemnity as an Exception to the No
Contribution Rule
Common law indemnity "evolved in the unnatural surroundings
of an inflexible rule against contribution"2 2 and was recognized as
an exception to this rule 8 which was created to alleviate its harsh-
ness.24 To justify the exception, courts were required to find distin-
guishing circumstances of sufficient magnitude to warrant a depar-
ture from the no contribution rule.
In one class of cases, common law indemnity was awarded with-
out violating the fault principle upon which the no contribution
and contributory negligence rules were rationalized. Fault had no
role in claims for indemnity made by an indemnitee who was not
personally at fault in causing injuries to the third person, such as
an employer held liable solely because of respondeat superior. In
this class of cases, therefore, indemnity could be allowed on princi-
ples of restitution without regard to the no contribution rule.25
In cases where both the indemnitee and the indemnitor were at
fault, however, a sufficient reason to excuse the indemnitee's fault
had to be found before indemnity could be allowed. A small num-
ber of decisions outside of Florida allowed indemnity based on
principles of the "last clear chance" doctrine, which had become
the primary exception to the contributory negligence rule." By
similar reasoning, some courts held that a defendant who is merely
negligent is entitled to indemnity from a defendant who has en-
(current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1979)).
21. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973). The relationship between compar-
ative negligence and contribution is discussed in Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 391
(Fla. 1975).
22. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 331 N.Y.S. 2d 382, 382 (1972) (citation omitted).
23. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 143 So. 316, 316 (Fla.
1932).
24. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 389 (Fla. 1975).
25. The Restatement of Restitution has recognized this well-established right to indem-
nity in this class of cases. "A person who, without personal fault, has become subject to tort
liability for the unauthorized and wrongful conduct of another, is entitled to indemnity from
the other for expenditures properly made in the discharge of such liability." RESTATEMENT
OF RESTITUTION § 96 (1937).
26. See, e.g., Colorado & S. Ry. v. Western Light & Power Co., 214 P. 30 (Colo. 1923).
See also cases cited in RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Reporters' Notes § 97, at 163 (1937).
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gaged in reckless conduct.2 7
The factors which support exceptions to the contributory negli-
gence rule can arguably be applied to justify indemnity as well
since both the contributory negligence and no contribution rules
are bottomed on the same fault principle. The great majority of
courts, however, refused to allow indemnity based upon these fac-
tors. The probable explanation for this is that the sympathy for a
person suffering from personal injuries which led to the recognition
of exceptions to the contributory negligence rule was absent where
one negligent defendant was seeking indemnity from another.
Indemnity when both the indemnitee and the indemnitor have
been negligent has also been recognized in favor of a municipality
held liable for injuries caused by a dangerous condition in a side-
walk or street which was created by an adjacent landowner or a
person using the street with the municipality's permission.2 8 In
these municipality cases, indemnity has been allowed even though
the municipality was aware of the dangerous condition, unless the
condition existed long enough to signify the municipality's acquies-
cence in its continuance.2 9 Although the courts often speak of ac-
tive and passive negligence as a basis for indemnity, these cases are
better explained by an understandable desire on the part of the
courts to protect the public coffers. This is accomplished by shift-
ing a portion of the extensive liability imposed on municipalities
for maintenance of sidewalks and streets to the private parties who
actually create the dangerous condition. Indemnity has also been
applied for the benefit of a private person when the plaintiff was
injured by a dangerous condition negligently created on the defen-
dant's property by the indemnitor. s° In these cases, however, there
27. See Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 175 P. 97 (Kan. 1918); Annot., 88
A.L.R.2d 1355 (1963).
28. See County of Alameda v. Southern Pac. Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1961); City and
County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 330 P.2d 802 (Cal. 1958); City of Des Moines v. Barnes,
30 N.W.2d 170 (Iowa 1947). See also cases cited in RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Reporters'
Notes § 95, at 153 (1937). Contra, City of Chicago v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 57 N.E. 795 (Ill.
1900); City of Seattle v. Andrew Peterson & Co., 170 P. 140 (Wash. 1918).
29. In the Restatement of Restitution it is stated:
The fact that the payor knew of the existence of the dangerous condition is not of
itself sufficient to bar him from restitution. In many cases it is only because he
had knowledge of the condition that he is liable to the person harmed. If, however,
the payor not only knew of the condition but acquiesced in its continuance, he
becomes in effect, a joint participant with the other in the tortious conduct and
hence is barred from indemnity.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 95, Comment a (1937).
30. See cases cited in RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Reporters' Notes § 95, at 153-57
(1937).
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has been a greater tendency to allow indemnity only to owners who
did not have actual knowledge of the defective condition but were
merely passively negligent.3 1
In spite of the prevailing no contribution rule, the municipality
cases are justifiable to the extent that the policy of protecting the
public finances, together with the equities involved, outweigh the
policies of the no contribution rule. The private landowner -cases
are justifiable to the extent that the active-passive negligence basis
of indemnity is sound.
A further basis for awarding indemnity, which has been rejected
in Florida,82 can be found in cases from other jurisdictions which
allow a negligent tortfeasor to recover indemnity from a doctor
whose negligence has aggravated an injured third person's injuries,
thereby increasing the negligent tortfeasor's liability to the injured
third person.8" This basis of indemnity can best be justified as an
exception to the no contribution rule by principles governing the
apportionment of damages between parties who partially cause the
loss to the plaintiff.
3. Common Law Indemnity Based Upon a Duty Owed to
Indemnitee
The most significant and consistent factor used to justify the al-
lowance of common law indemnity where both parties are at fault
has been the recognition of a duty owed by the indemnitor to the
indemnitee arising out of some prior relationship between the par-
ties. This duty is sometimes referred to as a pretort duty between
the indemnitee and the indemnitor.
The significance of this pretort duty in justifying common law
indemnity was recognized in the first important case in Florida to
establish the right to common law indemnity, Seaboard Air Line
Railway v. American District Electric Protective Co.8 In this case,
the railway company entered into a contract with a signal company
which allowed the signal company to "maintain" and "operate" a
31. See, e.g., Derry Elec. Co. v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 31 F.2d 51 (1st Cir. 1929);
Florida Power Corp. v. Taylor, 332 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
32. Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So.. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977). In Underwriters at Lloyds v. City
of Lauderdale Lakes, 382 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 1980), however, the Florida Supreme Court held
that the initial tortfeasor may bring a separate, independent action for subrogation against a
negligent doctor.
33. See Gertz v. Campbell, 302 N.E.2d 40 (Ill. 1973); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Trow-
bridge, 321 N.E.2d 787 (Ohio 1975). See also Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 639 (1966).
34. 143 So. 316 (Fla. 1932).
TORT INDEMNITY
signal system on the railway's property. An employee of the rail-
way was injured when the signal company negligently allowed a
wire to sag. In an indemnity action by Seaboard against the signal
company, the court held that Seaboard was entitled to indemnity
from the signal company because, although the railway was negli-
gent to its employee in failing to warn him of the sagging wire, the
signal company violated its duty to safely maintain and operate
the signal system.
The court's holding is stated, in part, as follows:
Generally, one of two joint tortfeasors cannot have contribution
from the other. But there are exceptions to this rule, one of which
is in that class of cases where although both parties are at fault
and both liable to the person injured, such as an employee of one
of them, yet they are not in pari delicto as to each other, as where
the injury has resulted from a violation of the duty which one
owes the other, so that as between themselves, the act or omission
of the one from whom indemnity is sought is the primary cause of
the injury.3s
4. Justifiable Reliance as a Basis for Common Law
Indemnity
Justifiable reliance has also been an important justification for
allowing common law indemnity. In various cases, justifiable re-
liance, though not expressly identified as a factor justifying an al-
lowance of indemnity, has been implicitly involved as a corollary to
the duty owed by one tortfeasor to another. In Seaboard Air Line,
for example, the railway relied upon the signal company to per-
form its contractual duty to prevent its wires from sagging. In
many cases, however, justifiable reliance has been expressly recog-
nized as a prerequisite to the allowance of common law
indemnity3 6
In addition to case authority, scholarly opinion has recognized
justifiable reliance as an important basis for justifying common law
indemnity. As Professor Bohlen has stated, "Justifiable reliance is
left as the soundest ground upon which the right to indemnity can
be placed. '37
35. Id. at 316 (emphasis in original). Seaboard Air Line Ry. was followed in Suwannee
Valley Elec. Coop. v, Live Oak, Perry, & Gulf R.R., 73 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1954), which involved
a similar factual situation.
36. See cases cited in RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrUTION, Reporters' Notes §§ 90, 93 (1937).
37. Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Torteasors, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 469, 478
1980]
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5. Distinction Between Active and Passive Negligence
as a Basis for Common Law Indemnity
Another important basis of common law indemnity has been the
court-drawn distinction between active and passive negligence. Ac-
tive negligence is the negligent creation of a dangerous condition or
the negligent failure to act for the protection of an injured person
after gaining actual knowledge of the dangerous condition. Passive
negligence is the negligent failure to discover a dangerous condi-
tion created by another.88
The Florida cases frequently refer to active and passive negli-
gence as a basis for awarding indemnity. The clearest and most
comprehensive discussions of the active-passive tortfeasor indem-
nity rule as it existed before 1979 in Florida are found in Winn-
Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows89 and Florida Power Corp. v. Taylor,40
both of which define passive negligence as the failure to discover a
dangerous condition created by another and active negligence as
the creation of the dangerous condition or the negligent failure to
act after making an actual discovery of its existence.
The principle defect in the analysis contained in these cases is
that they recognize the right to indemnity based upon a difference
in the kinds of negligence involved. They dispense with the addi-
tional requirement that there be a pretort duty between the par-
ties. This is unsound because the law of negligence does not gener-
ally make any distinction between acts of omission and acts of
commission. 4'1 For example, if a customer negligently fails to dis-
(1937) (footnote omitted).
38. The origin of the distinction between active and passive negligence and the signifi-
cance that it has been accorded in allowing common law indemnity has been described by
Professor Bohlen.
The principal authority for the view that the negligence of the defendant
against whom indemnity is sought must be different in kind from that of the
claimant and not merely prior in time of commission is the case of Union Stock-
yards Co. v. Chicago R.R., [196 U.S. 217 (1904)]. The great authority of the Court
has led to an undue acceptance of the view that "active" negligence in creation of
the dangerous condition on the part of the defendant and "passive" negligence on
the part of the claimant in failing to discover the danger are essential to
indemnity.
Bohlen, supra note 37, at 482 (citation added) (footnotes omitted).
39. 153 So. 2d 45, 49-50 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
40. 332 So. 2d 687, 690-91 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
41. Florida Standard Jury Instructions 4.1 states:
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care. Reasonable care is that degree of
care which a reasonably careful person would use under like circumstances. Negli-
gence may consist either in doing something that a reasonably careful person
would not do under like circumstances or in failing to do something that a reason-
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cover a dangerous condition created by the negligence of the
store's employees, it is clear that his negligence will reduce his re-
covery under the defense of comparative negligence. There can be
no justification for a different result where one defendant sues an-
other for indemnity.
The distinction between active and passive negligence has
played a proper role, however, in extending common law indemnity
to cases where there was a pretort duty between the indemnitor
and the indemnitee upon which the latter was entitled to rely. For
example, if the purchaser of a product failed to inspect the product
before using it or selling it because of his reliance upon the sup-
plier, his negligence is not necessarily incompatible with allowing
common law indemnity on the basis of the purchaser's reliance on
the proper performance of the duty owed by the supplier. If, how-
ever, the purchaser in this example discovered that the product
was defective and unsafe, he could no longer claim reliance. His
active negligence would therefore bar his claim for common law
indemnity.
B. Houdaille Industries, Inc. v. Edwards
Houdaille Industries, Inc. v. Edwards42 illustrates the continu-
ing attempt by third parties held liable to an injured employee to
recover common law indemnity from the employer.4' The third
party tortfeasor in Houdaille, Florida Wire and Cable Co., sup-
plied steel wire cable to the employer, Houdaille Industries, which
used the steel wire cable in manufacturing concrete beams by
stretching the steel cable through a mold into which the concrete
was poured. Eddie Edwards, an employee of Houdaille, was killed
when the cable broke. Edwards' personal representative sued
Florida Wire for his wrongful death, alleging that Florida Wire had
caused Edwards' death by breaching its implied warranty of
ably careful person would do under like circumstances.
In Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466, 472 (Mo. 1978) the court
stated: "Negligence is negligence. There is no such thing as 'good' negligence and 'bad' negli-
gence, or some kind of negligence which should be overlooked and another kind which
should not." In a similar vein, Prosser has observed, "Gross negligence is merely the same
thing as ordinary negligence, 'with the addition' as Baron Rolfe once put it 'of a vituperative
epithet."' W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at § 34.
42. 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979).
43. A recent summary of the same struggle in admiralty between third parties and em-
ployers of injured employees can be found in Misener Marine Constr. Co. v. Southport
Marine, Inc., 377 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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fitness.""
Florida Wire in turn filed a third party complaint for indemnity
against Houdaille, alleging that Houdaille was actively negligent in
its use of the steel wire cable and that Houdaille's negligence con-
stituted a breach of duty owed to Florida Wire.45 The trial court
granted Houdaille's motion for summary judgment. If Florida Wire
were held liable to the plaintiff, the court reasoned, its liability
could only be based upon primary wrongdoing, such as a breach of
warranty or active negligence.46 On appeal, the district court re-
versed, ruling that the allegations of the third party complaint
were sufficient to entitle Florida Wire to indemnity against
Houdaille Industries under the active-passive tortfeasor doctrine.'7
In reaching this conclusion, the district court reasoned that Florida
Wire could not automatically be held to be an active tortfeasor be-
cause "[bireach of warranty is a species of liability which may, or
may not, involve actual fault or active negligence on the part of the
manufacturer."'
The Florida Supreme Court reversed. In doing so, it completely
abolished the distinction between active and passive negligence as
a basis for common law indemnity. The Florida Supreme Court
stated, inter alia, that:
Florida Wire's claim that Edwards' death resulted solely from
the negligence of Houdaille states a complete defense to the origi-
nal action. It does not establish that Florida Wire is vicariously,
constructively, derivatively, or technically liable for Houdaille's
negligence. If both Florida Wire and Houdaille are at fault, no
matter how slight the fault of the former, the principles of indem-
nity preclude Florida Wire's recovery of indemnity against
Houdaille. 49
The fault referred to in the above quotation was Florida Wire's
strict liability for breaching an implied warranty of fitness by
manufacturing and selling a defective product. The holding in
Houdaille, accordingly, not only abolishes common law indemnity
in active and passive negligence cases, but also abolishes it where
44. 374 So. 2d at 492.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Home Indem. Co. v. Edwards, 360 So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978),
vacated, 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979).
48. Id. at 1114.
49. 374 So. 2d at 494.
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the defendant claiming indemnity is held strictly liable for creating
a dangerous condition which injures a plaintiff.
To be entitled to receive common law indemnity under the hold-
ing in Houdaille, therefore, a party must show that he is entirely
without fault and has been subjected to liability to the injured
third person because of the imposition of some "vicarious, con-
structive, derivative or technical" liability. Whatever definition is
given to these terms must, of necessity, exclude liability based in
any way on the personal fault of the party claiming indemnity.
The court in HoudaiUe did not refer to earlier holdings which
allowed common law indemnity to a passively negligent tortfeasor.
Instead the court rested its holding upon cases such as Stuart v.
Hertz Corp.,50 which denied common law indemnity to an actively
negligent tortfeasor. The Houdaille decision nevertheless overrules
sub silentio earlier cases which recognized the right of a passively
negligent tortfeasor to receive common law indemnity."
The Houdaille result is logical in view of Florida's adoption of
the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasor's Act,52 which
allows contribution to joint tortfeasors on a comparative fault
basis. As Professor Bohlen aptly observed many years ago, the al-
lowance of common law indemnity where, both tortfeasors are at
fault "is justified only by the traditional denial of contribution be-
tween joint or co-tortfeasors. Had this taboo not existed, justice
would have been satisfied by a proper apportionment of the bur-
den in accordance with the respective responsibility, of which cul-
pability is only one element, of the claimant and defendant." 53
In addition to holding that Florida Wire's fault in breaching its
implied warranty of fitness barred its common law indemnity
claim, the Florida Supreme Court also held that a user of a prod-
uct owes no duty to a supplier to exercise reasonable care in using
the product, unless there is a contract between the user and sup-
plier which imposes such a duty." It follows that even a supplier of
50. 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
51. Suwannee Valley Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Live Oak, Perry & Gulf R.R., 73 So. 2d 820
(Fla. 1954); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 143 So. 316 (Fla.
1932); Florida Power Corp. v. Taylor, 332 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Winn-
Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
52. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1979).
53. Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 469,
486 (1937).
54. The court indicated:
Furthermore, we find Florida Wire's contention that Houdaille owed a duty to it
to be without merit. The user of an item supplied by another, in the absence of a
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a product who is not at fault, such as a retailer who is held strictly
liable for injuries caused to a third person, cannot recover common
law indemnity from a negligent user of the product by contending
that his negligent use of the product breached a duty owed to the
supplier.55
Other jurisdictions have reached a result similar to the one
reached in Houdaille. In Pachowitz v. Milwaukee & Suburban
Transport Corp.,5 6 a Wisconsin court well states the reasoning sup-
porting the doctrine that contribution on a comparative fault basis,
is incompatible with common law indemnity to a tortfeasor whose
fault contributed to causing the third person's injuries. In that
case, the injured plaintiff sued the Transport Company for negli-
gently allowing her to alight from its bus at a defective and uneven
curb. The company cross-claimed for contribution or indemnity
against the city of Milwaukee, on the theory that the city was ac-
tively negligent in creating the dangerous condition while the
Transport Company was only passively negligent in failing to dis-
cover it. 57 In refusing to allow the indemnity claim, the court rea-
soned, in part, as follows:
If the Transport Company were found to be 95 percent negli-
gent, and the city 5 percent negligent, under its cause of action
for contribution, the Transport Company would recover from the
city 5 percent of the total award of damages. However, under its
cause of action for indemnity, the Transport Company would
have a right to 100 percent reimbursement against the city in
such a 95-5 situation if it could establish that its negligence was
"passive" while the negligence of the city was "active."
Such an all-or-nothing result between negligent co-tort-feasors
would be contrary to the Wisconsin concept of imposing liability
and awarding recovery in proportion to the percentage of causal
negligence attributable to each of the co-tort-feasors5 8
The above-stated principles in Pachowitz have been followed in a
number of cases.5 9
contract, does not owe the latter any duty of care in connection with the use of the
item so as to create a duty upon the user to indemnify the supplier.
374 So. 2d at 494.
55. See VTN Consol., Inc. v. Coastal Eng'r Assoc., Inc., 341 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1977).
56. 202 N.W.2d 268 (Wis. 1972).
57. Id. at 270.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 405-11 (1975); Kohr v.
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C. The Status of Common Law Indemnity After Houdaille
A proper understanding of the wide-reaching impact of the
Houdaille decision requires an examination of the Florida cases
and theories of common law indemnity that existed prior to
Houdaille in order to determine which of these cases and theories
of common law indemnity continue to be valid.
1. Cases Involving Fault Which Preclude Indemnity
Under Houdaille
a. Indemnitee's Negligence Generally as Barring Common
Law Indemnity
The holding in Houdaille that indemnity will be denied when-
ever the tortfeasor seeking indemnity is at fault, regardless of the
relative equities of the parties or other considerations, is of course,
entirely consistent with the many decisions prior to Houdaille
which denied indemnity where the tortfeasor seeking indemnity
was found actively negligent. Houdaille ratifies these prior deci-
sions and extends their principle to include all negligence.
Therefore, a negligent automobile driver held liable for the ag-
gravation of an injured plaintiff's injuries caused by the malprac-
tice of a treating physician will be denied indemnity against the
treating physician" or hospital.1 The same result obtains where a
surgeon who is sued for malpractice seeks indemnity against an-
other doctor whose alleged negligent postoperative treatment
caused the plaintiff's toe to be amputated.6 2 Similarly, where a
plaintiff's injury is aggravated by doctor's negligent administration
of a drug which was improperly placed on the market, the initial
tortfeasor cannot obtain indemnity from either the doctor or the
drug manufacturer.6 The Florida Supreme Court has recently
held, however, that the initial tortfeasor whose liability to the in-
jured plaintiff has been increased by the subsequent negligence of
Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 1974); Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d
465, 467-70 (3d Cir. 1967); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. Rptr. 692
(1978); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169, 179-80 (Me. 1971); Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., Inc.,
255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d
466 (Mo. 1978); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 282 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972).
60. See Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
61. See Walt Disney World Co. v. Memorial Hosp., 363 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1978). See generally Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 639 (1966).
62. See Lindsey v. Austin, 336 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
63. See Ewell Eng'r & Contracting Co. v. Cato, 361 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1978).
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a treating physician may bring a separate, independent action
against the physician for subrogation to recover that portion of the
initial tortfeasor's losses which "in fairness should be shared with a
negligent doctor."'
A tortfeasor who is actively negligent in failing to protect a
plaintiff from a dangerous condition actually discovered by the
tortfeasor will also be denied common law indemnity.68 The same
result follows when a food store, knowing of a dangerous condition
created by a construction company doing work within the store,
negligently fails to protect its customer from the danger.",
Similarly, if an electric power company knows that its high volt-
age transmission lines are in dangerous proximity to a roadway
which has been elevated in connection with a construction project,
but fails to act in a timely and reasonable way to eliminate the
danger, it cannot recover indemnity for its liability to a person in-
jured by the dangerous condition." An electric power company will
likewise be denied indemnity for damages to an injured plaintiff if
the power company knows that construction equipment is being
used in dangerous proximity to its transmission lines and thereaf-
ter unreasonably fails to de-energize its lines."8
The same principle prevents a car wash operator, who knows
that a dangerous traffic situation exists on his premises, from re-
ceiving indemnity from a driver who loses control of his automo-
bile while waiting to use the facilities." A county which operates a
bus with tempered glass in an area in which it is anticipated that
missiles might be thrown at the bus, and which is held liable to a
passenger who is injured by a brick thrown through the bus win-
dow, is not entitled to indemnity against the manufacturer of the
64. Underwriters at Lloyds v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 382 So.2d 702, 704 (Fla. 1980).
65. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
In Fellows a business invitor who discovered that a dangerous display of Pepsi-Cola cartons
had been constructed in its food store by a company supplying the soft drinks to the store
and thereafter failed to correct the dangerous display was denied indemnity from the soft
drink company for damages paid by the store operator to a plaintiff injured by the negligent
display.
66. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Virginia Constr. Co., 330 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1976).
67. See Florida Power Corp. v. Taylor, 332 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
68. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. General Safety Equip. Co., 213 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1968). See also Florida Power & Light Co. v. Schauer, 374 So. 2d 1159 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Schauer v. Blair Constr. Co., 374 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1979).
69. See Foss v. Moskowitz, 359 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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bus alleged to be liable for breach of warranty. 70 Additionally, the
owner of a health club held liable to its patron when a false ceiling
collapsed cannot recover from the contractor who installed the
ceiling, where the health club owner knows of the dangerous and
defective ceiling prior to its collapse.71
A tortfeasor who is guilty of negligently directing a subcontrac-
tor's activities;7' operating a train so fast around a curve that it
cannot be safely stopped;7 8 running an elevator when a repairman
is on top of the elevator car;7 4 contributing to causing injury to an
elementary school student who is struck by a motor vehicle;75 man-
ufacturing an elevator;76 performing an abortion;77 failing to pro-
vide warning signs, lights and other proper safety devices to inform
travelers of hazardous road construction;78 leaving a surgical in-
strument in a patient's abdomen;79 furnishing defective equip-
ment;80 and failing as a landlord to maintain an area of common
usage;81 will be denied indemnity because of his primary fault.
Houdaille states in the most emphatic terms that a tortfeasor
who is negligent in any way will be denied common law indemnity.
Courts in other jurisdictions which distinguish between active and
passive negligence as a basis for allowing common law indemnity
should adopt the sound rationale utilized in Houdaille.
70. See General Motors Corp. v. County of Dade, 272 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 3d Dist.. Ct. App.
1973).
71. See Roman Spa, Inc. v. Lubell, 364 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
72. See Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. T.P. Herndon & Co., 196 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1966).
73. See Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Gordon, 328 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1976).
74. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Adams, 340 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1965).
75. See A. L. Lewis Elementary School v. Metropolitan Dade County, 376 So. 2d 32 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
76. See Armor Elevator Co. v. Elevator Sales & Serv., Inc., 309 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1975).
77. See Ladies Center, Inc. v. Reno, 341 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
78. See Florida Rock & Sand Co. v. Cox, 344 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
79. See Maybarduck v. Bustamante, 294 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974). Al-
though the court held that the doctor claiming indemnity would be entitled to receive it if
he were held only vicariously liable, the opposite result would obtain under Houdaille if the
doctor himself were negligent in either leaving the instrument in the patient or in failing to
properly supervise the operation.
80. See Mims Crane Serv., Inc. v. Insley Mfg. Corp., 226 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1969).
81. See Air Agency, Inc.. v. British Airways, 370 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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b. Indemnitee's Strict Liability Arising from His Creation
of a Dangerous Condition Injuring a Third Person as
Barring Common Law Indemnity
Negligence is not the only kind of fault which will preclude in-
demnity under the rule of Houdaille. As held in Houdaille itself,
and in its companion case, Charles Poe Masonry, Inc. v. Spring
Lock Scaffolding Rental Equipment Co., 2 strict liability which is
imposed upon a manufacturer who makes and supplies a defective
product will also bar indemnity. The same result should follow
where the tortfeasor claiming common law indemnity has been
held strictly liable for keeping a wild animals or for engaging in an
abnormally dangerous activity."
Where, however, the party claiming common law indemnity has
not created the dangerous condition but is nevertheless subject to
strict liability of a vicarious nature, he should be allowed common
law indemnity. For example, the strict liability imposed upon an
innocent retailer for selling a defective product manufactured by
another is considered as "technical" or "constructive" liability
under the holding in Houdaille. The retailer held strictly liable to
his customer in these circumstances will be entitled to recover
common law indemnity from the manufacturer of the defective
product.
c. Indemnitee's Violation of Duty to Exercise the Highest
Degree of Care for the Protection of Another as Barring
Common Law Indemnity
Liability for damages caused by unintentional conduct is gener-
ally imposed for failure to exercise reasonable care. There are cer-
tain relationships, however, the principal one being the relation-
ship between a common carrier and its passengers, which create a
duty to exercise a higher than ordinary degree of care for the pro-
tection of other persons. This higher degree of care is defined as
that amount of care which a very careful person would have exer-
82. 374 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1979). See also Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 381 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1979), which holds that a manufacturer's strict liability for manufacturing a
defective product bars its claim for common law indemnity under the holding in Houdaille.
83. See Mapoles v. Mapoles, 350 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (dog-statutory
strict liability); Keyser v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 287 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1973) (rattlesnake); Isaacs v. Powell, 267 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1972) (chimpanzee).
84. See Cities Services Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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cised under similar circumstances.8 5 A common carrier, therefore,
may be held liable to its passengers for damages caused by conduct
that would not result in liability if engaged in by another defen-
dant. May a common carrier whose liability to its passenger is
based only upon a violation of this higher degree of care obtain
indemnity from another defendant whose negligent or reckless con-
duct contributed to causing the plaintiff's injuries?
The leading case allowing such indemnity is United Airlines,
Inc. v. Wiener.8" In this case, a United Airlines plane collided in
midair with an air force jet fighter near Las Vegas. Forty-two pas-
sengers and five crew members died, as did the two air force pilots.
The Ninth Circuit held that the government owed no contractual
or other pretort duty to United. Nevertheless, it was obligated to
indemnify United for the damages caused by its failure to exercise
the highest degree of care. 7
A Florida Court has reached an opposite conclusion. In Aircraft
85. Florida Standard Jury Instruction 4.5 states:
The reasonable care required of a common carrier for the safety of a passenger is
the highest degree of care that is consistent with the mode of transportation used
and the practical operation of the business of a common carrier of passengers. In
such a case negligence of a common carrier may consist either in doing something
that would not be done or in failing to do something that would be done by very
careful persons under the conditions and the circumstances then affecting the car-
rier and the passenger.
86. 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964).
87. Id. at 404. The court's rationalization was grounded upon the particular facts of the
case, as is shown in the following:
United's duty to appellees' decedents was to exercise the highest degree of care;
the government's duty was to exercise ordinary care. The government's negligent
acts occurred literally from the start to the finish of this tragic incident. The cu-
mulative effect of these negligent acts was to dispatch United's flight 736 and the
government's highspeed jet training mission, conducted by a student pilot who
was virtually blindfolded and an instructor whose cockpit preoccupations were
greater than ordinarily demanded of pilots flying under VFR conditions and re-
sponsibilities, into the same area without warning to those in control of either
craft.
If we accept the government's assertions, the government's pilots discovered
United's peril in time to effectively respond but engaged in a maneuver destined
to encounter rather than to evade. Contrasted with all of this is the finding that
United's pilots, to some disputed degree of probability, could have seen the jet
and, in discharge of the obligation to exercise the highest degree of care for their
passengers, should have seen and avoided the jet. In view of the disparity of du-
ties, the clear disparity of culpability, the likely operation of the last clear chance
doctrine and all the surrounding circumstances, the findings that United and the
government were in pari delicto are clearly erroneous and we hold that there is
such difference in the contrasted character of fault as to warrant indemnity in
favor of United in the nongovernment employee cases.
Id. (footnote omitted)(emphasis in original).
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Taxi Co. v. Perkins,88 a taxicab owner previously held liable to an
injured passenger sought common law indemnity from the driver
and owner of the other vehicle involved in the collision. The dis-
trict court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the taxicab owner's
complaint for common law indemnity because it was established
that both drivers were "actively" negligent.89
The holding in Aircraft Taxi Co. is consistent with the subse-
quent holding in Houdaille. Both agree in refusing to contrast the
character of fault by reference to the higher standard of care. A
breach of the duty to exercise the highest degree of care, even
though ordinary care was exercised, therefore, precludes common
law indemnity in Florida.
d. Indemnitee's Negligence as Barring Common Law Indem-
nity Against a Tortfeasor Guilty of Reckless Conduct
Reckless or willful conduct is higher on the scale of culpability
than is negligence. This difference in culpability has led negligent
defendants to claim indemnity against co-defendants alleged to
have been reckless.
In Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. Smith,90 an employer's bus
collided with a train operated by the Seaboard Coast Line Railroad
Company. The passenger employees, unable to sue their employer
because of the tort exemption provision of the Florida Workmen's
Compensation Act,91 instead sued Seaboard as a third party
tortfeasor. Seaboard filed a third party claim against the employer
seeking contribution and indemnity. The claim for contribution
was predicated upon a constitutional challenge of the section of
the Workmen's Compensation Statute which exempted employers
from contribution claims.92 This statutory provision had already
88. 227 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
89. Id. at 723. The court reasoned as follows:
The verdict rendered in the passenger's suit establishes that negligence of both
drivers was active, and combined to proximately cause the injuries. This is so even
though the duty of care placed on the driver of the taxicab was higher than that
owed by the driver of the other car to the party injured. . . . There was no duty
running to Aircraft from the driver of the other car, as there was to Aircraft from
its own driver. ...
Id. (citations omitted).
90. 359 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1978).
91. Ch. 17481 § 11, 1935 Fla. Laws 1462 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.11 (1979)).
The section provided, in part: "(1) The liability of an employer prescribed in § 440.10 shall
be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to any third party tortfeasor
and to the employee, . . . on account of such injury or death, . ... Id. § 11(1).
92. 359 So. 2d at 427-28.
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been declared unconstitutional as applied to claims for indemnity
brought by third party tortfeasors against employers." The court
distinguished contribution from indemnity on the grounds that un-
like indemnity, contribution "does not rest on the legal relation-
ship between the tortfeasors"; it therefore rejected Seaboard's
contention that the section was unconstitutional as applied to con-
tribution claims."
Seaboard's indemnity claim was based upon its allegations that
the employer was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct, while
Seaboard was merely negligent. Seaboard argued, on equitable
principles, that a negligent tortfeasor should be entitled to recover
indemnity from a tortfeasor guilty of willful and wanton miscon-
duct.95 As authority, Seaboard cited the Fourth District's opinion
in Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 6 in which common law indemnity was
allowed on principles of equity, even though the tortfeasor claim-
ing indemnity had been negligent. The supreme court rejected this
argument, observing that Stuart had been overruled.91 With re-
spect to the contention that indemnity could be based on the dif-
ference between negligence and recklessness, the court stated that
"[w]e have heretofore stated that we find no basis for applying dif-
ferent degrees of negligence in determining liability under such
circumstances."98
The above holding in Seaboard is consistent with the reasoning
and holding of Houdaille. The issue is therefore squarely settled in
Florida consistently with the result reached in other jurisdictions."9
2. Cases in Which Indemnity Remains Allowable After
Houdaille
a. Intentional Misconduct by an Indemnitor as a Basis for
Allowing Common Law Indemnity in Favor of a Tortfeasor
Guilty of Only Ordinary Negligence
Intentional or criminal misconduct of a third person which inter-
venes between a defendant's negligent act and an injury to another
93. See Sunspan Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., 310 So. 2d 4 (Fla.
1975).
94. 359 So. 2d at 429.
95. Id. at 428.
96. 302 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
97. 359 So. 2d at 430.
98. Id.
99. See Panasuk v. Seaton, 277 F. Supp. 979 (D. Mont. 1968); Jacobs v. General Acci-
dent Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 109 N.W.2d 462 (Wis. 1961).
19801
404 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:383
will often be held to be a superseding cause which relieves the neg-
ligent defendant from liability. Special circumstances, however,
may make the intentional or ciminal misconduct reasonably fore-
seeable. In such cases, liability will still be imposed on the initial,
negligent tortfeasor.
For example, it has been held that a party who negligently leaves
keys in an automobile which is stolen may be held liable to a per-
son injured by the thief's negligent operation of the automobile;100
a motel owner may be held liable to a guest injured by an intruder
who entered because inadequate locks were used; 0 a defendant
who negligently installed a burglar alarm system may be held lia-
ble for losses caused by burglary;10 2 and a restaurant owner whose
negligence created an unreasonable risk of fire may be held liable
for injuries caused to its business invitees by the intentional mis-
conduct of a person which caused the fire.103
Furthermore, a special relationship may exist between parties
which imposes a duty on one party to protect the other from the
intentional or criminal misconduct of a third person. Under this
principle of law, a restaurant owner may be held liable for negli-
gently failing to protect one of its patrons from the intentional
misconduct of another patron;104 an accounting firm which negli-
gently provides accounting and auditing services to a hospital may
be held liable for losses caused by embezzlement committed by the
hospital's chief executive officer;105 and a common carrier which
fails to warn its passenger of the danger of felonious attack at its
destination terminal located in a high crime area will be subject to
liability to its passenger who is assaulted at this location.1 "6
Should the negligent defendant in the above cases be allowed
indemnity against the intentional wrongdoer in light of the holding
in Houdaille denying indemnity to a tortfeasor who is at fault?
Apart from the fact that allowing indemnity against the inten-
tional wrongdoer in such cases is supported by eminent scholarly
opinion 1 7 and by the Restatement of Restitution,0 8 there are
100. See Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 354 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1978).
101. See Rosier v. Gainesville Inns Assocs., 347 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1977).
102. See Singer v. I.A. Durbin, Inc., 348 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
103. See Concord Fla. Inc. v. Lewin, 341 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
104. See Steak Enterprises, Inc. v. Claus, 345 So. 2d 1075 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
105. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Sun Bank, 366 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
106. See Werndli v. Greyhound Corp., 365 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
107. Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 469,
479 (1937).
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sound reasons to distinguish a claim of indemnity against an inten-
tional tortfeasor from a claim of indemnity against a negligent
tortfeasor.
On the scale of civil as well as criminal culpability, intentional
wrongdoing ranks highest. As a consequence, intentional wrongdo-
ing has been subjected to the severest of legal sanctions and has
been treated differently from negligent misconduct in a number of
significant ways. Thus, unlike a negligent defendant, an intentional
wrongdoer cannot raise the defense of contributory or comparative
negligence 09 and in most jurisdictions he is liable for punitive as
well as compensatory damages. 110 In doubtful cases, the courts are
inclined to trace the consequences of an intentional tortfeasor's
wrongful acts further under principles of proximate or legal causa-
tion than they would in the case of merely negligent acts."1
A further distinction is made under principles of proximate or
legal causation between intentional and negligent conduct. Courts
often treat the intervening negligence of a third person as a fore-
seeable intervening cause which will not relieve an initially negli-
gent defendant from liability.1'" Intervening criminal misconduct
of a third person, however, has often been regarded as an unfore-
seeable, supervening cause which will relieve an initially negligent
defendant from liability, 13 absent special circumstances.1 1 4 Flor-
ida's contribution statute also recognizes a distinction between
negligence and intentional misconduct by denying contribution to
intentional tortfeasors. "There is no right of contribution in favor
of any tortfeasor who has intentionally (willfully or wantonly)
caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death." 5
These principles suggest that a different result is justified when
common law indemnity is sought from an intentional tortfeasor
rather than one who is merely negligent. Allowing indemnity based
upon the disparity in fault between negligence and intentional mis-
108. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 96 (1937).
109. See Deane v. Johnston, 104 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1958).
110. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 2.
111. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 43.
112. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 44.
113. See, e.g., Drake v. Sun Bank and Trust Co., 377 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979); Gulfstar, Inc. v. Advance Mortgage Corp., 376 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1979).
114. See, e.g., Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 354 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1977); Orkin
Exterminating Co. v. Culpepper, 367 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). As the crime
rate increases, certain types of criminal conduct are daily becoming more foreseeable.
115. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(c) (1979).
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conduct involving serious wrongdoing is consistent with the vary-
ing treatment that these different kinds of conduct have received
in the law of torts. It is also compatible with society's moral values
and sense of justice.
As Professor Lowndes has forcefully stated:
If a defendant has intentionally injured the plaintiff . . . it is
clearly socially desirable that he should suffer for his misconduct.
The fact that the plaintiff has Contributed to his own injury by
negligently failing to safeguard his own interests is overborne by
the public interest in discouraging conduct like that of the defen-
dant .... It may be possible to repress malice or stimulate in-
difference by fear. "
It would seem proper, therefore, to recognize a deterrence-based
right of indemnity against an intentional wrongdoer, and to hold
that in such a case the negligent tortfeasor is not limited to his
right of contribution. The Houdaille holding should not be applied
to bar indemnity in this situation.
This analysis, however, requires a reexamination of the Florida
Supreme Court's holding in Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v.
Smith."17 The Court there held that a negligent tortfeasor could
not obtain common law indemnity from one guilty of recklessness
or willful misconduct." 8 Although recklessness generally involves a
lesser degree of culpability than intentional misconduct, it also in-
volves greater culpability than negligence. Unlike negligence, for
example, recklessness will support a claim for punitive damages
and will not be subject to the defense of contributory or compara-
tive negligence. 11 An argument can therefore be made that the
holding in Seaboard denying indemnity against a reckless
tortfeasor should extend in principle to bar indemnity against an
intentional torifeasor guilty of serious wrongdoing.
Notwithstanding the similarities between recklessness and inten-
tional misconduct, recklessness is nontheless a form of uninten-
tional conduct. It does not arouse the degree of social disapproval
stimulated by intentional conduct involving serious wrongdoing.
This distinction is sufficient to justify a different treatment of the
two types of misconduct under common law indemnity.
116. Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 Gzo. L.J. 674, 687 (1933-34).
117. 359 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1978).
118. Id. at 430.
119. See Deane v. Johnston, 104 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1958); W. PROSSER, supra note 10, at 344.
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b. Common Law Indemnity in Favor of an Innocent Party
Held Liable for Acting at the Direction of Another
In the 1847 case of Croom v. Swann,110 the Florida Supreme
Court stated, in dictum, that an agent held liable for making false
representations as to the goods of his principal is entitled to in-
demnity from his principal if it can be shown that the principal
deceived him, and that the agent acted in good faith reliance on
the principal's orders or instructions. It is implicit in the court's
dictum that the agent could recover indemnity from his principal
only if the agent were unaware of the falsity of the representations.
This dictum in Croom v. Swann is consistent with a rule of in-
demnity followed in other jurisdictions and adopted in the Re-
statement of Restitution, which states:
A person who, at the direction of and on account of another,
has done an authorized act because of which both are liable in
tort, is entitled to indemnity from the other for expenditures
properly made in the discharge of such liability, if he acted in
reliance upon the lawfulness of the direction, and, as between the
two, his reliance was justifiable.21
In comment a of section 90 it is stated, in part, that "[rieliance
upon the lawfulness of the direction is essential to indemnity. It is
not, however, a bar to indemnity that the person who acted was
careless in relying upon the direction, nor is it essential that he
should have believed that there was no doubt as to its lawful-
ness."
1 2
To what extent does the above rule of indemnity have validity in
Florida after Houdaille? The holding in Houdaille that a tort-
feasor who is at fault cannot obtain indemnity would appear to
preclude indemnity in any case where the employee or agent was
personally at fault in obeying his principal's directions.
On the other hand, where the agent or employee is not person-
ally at fault in following his employer's directions, indemnity
seems to be proper. For example, if the agent or employee follows
his employer's instructions and trespasses upon the plaintiff's land
under the reasonable belief that he is entitled to do so, or if he
,innocently converts the goods of another, the agent or employee's
liability in these situations should be classified as "technical" or
120. 1 Fla. 211, 213 (1847).
121. RESTATEMENT Op REsTrruTioN § 90 (1936).
122. Id. at § 90. Comment a (1937).
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"constructive" liability within the meaning of the exception in
Houdaille. The agent or employee should then be entitled to ob-
tain indemnity from his employer.
The basic principles underlying the foregoing analysis are illus-
trated in the Florida statutory provision governing a sheriff's du-
ties and responsibilities in levying upon property pursuant to a
writ issued by a Florida court. Where there is a risk that the sheriff
will be held liable for making wrongful levy, the sheriff, before
making the levy, "may require the plaintiff suing out the writ to
furnish a bond" to indemnify him against any damages that he
may suffer as a result of making a wrongful levy. 2 $ The rationale
for allowing statutory indemnity for sheriffs should apply as well
to an agent who is held liable without fault.
c. Common Law Indemnity in Favor of an Innocent Party
Held Liable Because of a Relationship with
Another
In Houdaille the Florida Supreme Court held that common law
indemnity remains available to a party who is held liable solely
upon principles of "vicarious, constructive, technical or derivative"
liability. As clearly indicated in Houdaille, this means any liability
which is imposed by law on one party because of his relationship
with the actual wrongdoer.
This principle from Houdaille is consistent with earlier holdings
which allowed indemnity to a party held liable for the negligence
of another. An employer held liable under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior for the negligence of his employee has been held to
be entitled to indemnity from his negligent employee.1 2 ' Moreover,
it has been established that a defendant who has been held liable,
without personal fault, to a business invitee for breach of a nondel-
egable duty to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition
may recover indemnity against his negligent independent contrac-
tor hired to discharge the nondelegable duty.1 25
123. FLA. STAT. § 30.30(1) (1979).
124. See American Home Assurance Co. v. City of Opa Locka, 368 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Kellman, 375 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Grand Union Co. v. Prudential Bldg. Maint. Corp., 226 So. 2d 117 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969). See also Cook v. Holland, 575 S.W.2d 468 (Ky. App. 1978)(trustee
held personally liable for a tort committed by his agent or employees in the administration
of the trust held entitled to indemnity out of trust estate); Stevenson Ins. Assocs. v. Cohen,
228 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 3d.Dist. Ct. App. 1969)(insurance company's indemnity against broker-
agent).
125. See Grand Union Co. v. Prudential Bldg. Maint. Corp., 226 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d Dist.
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The breach of other implied or express contractual duties which
result in vicarious tort liability will likewise support a claim for
indemnity against the wrongdoer. For example, a private surgeon's
allegation that a hospital breached its implied contractual duty to
supply him with a qualified assistant physician was held to state a
cause of action for common law indemnity for the resulting imposi-
tion of vicarious liability upon the private surgeon. 12 6
d. Common Law Indemnity in Favor of an Innocent Party
Held Strictly Liable for Injuries Caused by Defective Product
Manufactured by Another
Products liability claims constitute a special class of cases in
which duties arising from contractual relationships have been held
to justify common law indemnity.12 7 It is now recognized in Florida
and in other jurisdictions that a manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer
or other supplier of a defective product can be held strictly liable
for injuries caused by the defective product.12 This law of strict
liability applies to cases in which, for example, a nonnegligent re-
tailer is subject to strict liability for injuries caused to his pur-
chaser by a defective product manufacturer and supplied by an-
other. The retailer's liability constitutes a cause of action for
indemnity against the manufacturer for breach of its duty to sup-
ply the retailer with a product reasonably safe for its intended
purposes. 129
The same result occurs when a manufacturer of a finished prod-
uct is held strictly liable for injuries caused to a third person by a
Ct. App. 1969); Olin's Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Royal Continental Hotels, Inc., 187 So. 2d
349 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co., 166 So. 2d
211 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964). See also Atlantic Coast Dev. Corp. v. Napoleon Steel
Contractors, Inc., No. 79-913, 25 FLA. L.W. 1185 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. June 10, 1980).
126. See Maybarduk v. Bustamante, 294 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
127. For other cases discussing claims for indemnity arising in products liability cases,
see: Annot., 28 A.L.R.3d 943 (1969); Davis, Comparative Negligence, Comparative Contri-
bution, and Equal Protection in the Trial and Settlement of Multiple Defendant Product
Cases, 10 IND. L. REV. 831 (1977); Jensvold, A Modern Approach to Loss Allocation Among
Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 58 MINN. L. REV. 723 (1974); Phillips, Contribution
and Indemnity in Products Liability, 42 TENN. L. REV. 85 (1974); 79 DICK. L. REV. 125
(1974); 2 HOPSTRA L. REV. 845 (1974).
128. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) TORTS § 402A (1964).
129. See Pender v. Skillcraft Indus., Inc., 358 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Insurance Co. of North America v. King, 340 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976). See
also cases collected in Mims Crane Ser., Inc. v. Insley Mfg. Corp., 226 So. 2d 836, 839 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1967).
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defective component part that was purchased from a supplier and
integrated into the finished product. Where the manufacturer is
not himself negligent, he is entitled to recover indemnity from the
party supplying the defective component part.130
The Houdaille decision does not change the availability of in-
demnity in these cases as long as the retailer, manufacturer or
other party claiming indemnity has not been negligent or otherwise
personally at fault in causing the injuries. As is made clear in
Houdaille, the strict liability that is imposed upon the retailer or
manufacturer in the above examples is regarded by the court as
"technical" or "constructive" liability.
A different situation may exist where the manufacturer's liability
arises because of a defective component supplied by another and
incorporated into the product which is subsequently sold to one
injured by the defect. In such a case, depending upon the particu-
lar circumstances, the manufacturer may have a right of indemni-
fication against its supplier. In that case, a manufacturer who is
held liable for a breach of an implied warranty of fitness could be
without fault insofar as its relationship with the supplier of the
component part is concerned and may be permitted to seek in-
demnification from the supplier.13'
There will be a different result, however, if the retailer or other
party claiming indemnity against a manufacturer is himself negli-
gent in causing the third person's injuries, or is vicariously respon-
sible for the negligence of another person which contributed to
causing such injuries.132
e. Common Law Indemnity in Favor of a Party Held
Vicariously Liable Under the Dangerous Instrumentality
Doctrine
A noncontractual duty between an indemnitor and an indemni-
tee may also serve as a basis for allowing common law indemnity.
Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine, for example, makes
the owner of an automobile vicariously liable for damages caused
by the negligence of a person using the automobile with his con-
130. See Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490, 493-94 (Fla. 1979); Burbage
v. Boiler Eng'r & Supply Co., 249 A.2d 563 (Pa. 1969); Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 1016 (1965).
131. 374 So. 2d at 493-94 n.3 (citation omitted).
132. See Dura Corp. v. Wallace, 297 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
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sent. 33 Under the holding in Houdaille, a tortfeasor held vicari-
ously liable for plaintiff's damages may recover indemnity from the
actual wrongdoer. This is consistent with previous cases holding
that the owner of an automobile held vicariously liable under the
dangerous instrumentality doctrine may obtain indemnity from a
negligent driver using the car with the owner's consent. 3 4
The rule of Houdaille is also consistent with earlier holdings
that an owner of an automobile who either loans "' or leases it's" to
an employer whose employee then negligently injures a third party
is entitled to indemnity from the employer because the negligence
of the employee is imputed to the employer. This imputation of
negligence for indemnity purposes is in accord with the general
rule that an employee's negligence will be imputed to i-is employer
where the rights of third persons are involved.13 7
The foregoing principles of common law indemnity arising from
the dangerous instrumentality doctrine are subject to modification
by automobile lease provisions regarding liability insurance. Where
the lessor agrees in the lease to provide liability insurance cover-
age, neither the lessor nor its insurer has a right of indemnity
against the lessee.3" But if the lessor is held liable under the dan-
gerous instrumentality doctrine for more than the amount of insur-
133. See Southern Cotten Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629 (Fla. 1920). For a policy analy-
sis of the cases allowing indemnity where liability is imposed under the dangerous instru-
mentality doctrine, see Walkowiak, Implied Indemnity: A Policy Analysis of the Total Loss
Shifting Remedy in a Partial Loss Shifting Jurisdiction, 30 U. FLA. L. REV. 501, 527-39
(1978).
134. See Truck Discount Corp. v. Serrano, 362 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
Hertz Corp. v. Richards, 224 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Fincher Motor Sales,
Inc. v. Lakin, 156 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
135. See Hutchins v. Frank E. Campbell, Inc., 123 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1960).
136. See Hertz Corp. v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 419 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1969).
137. In Houdaille, the Florida Supreme Court stated that common law indemnity shifts
the entire loss "to another who should bear the costs because it was the latter's wrongdoing
for which the former is held liable." 374 So. 2d at 493. An argument can be made that this
language excludes indemnity in favor of an automobile owner against an employer to whom
the car was leased or loaned whose employee negligently injures another, since the employer
was not personally at fault, However, such an argument does not appear to be sound. The
problem addressed in Houdaille was whether a party at fault could recover common law
indemnity, not whether a party not personally at fault could be liable for indemnity. The
holdings in Hutchins v. Frank E. Campbell, Inc., 123 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1960) and Hertz Corp. v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 419 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1969) are sound and
Houdaille should not be interpreted as modifying them.
138. See Roth v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1972); Morse Auto Rentals v.
Papandrea, 180 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Morse Auto Rentals, Inc. v. Lewis,
161 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
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ance agreed to be provided, then the lessor is entitled to indemnity
for the excess from the lessee."
On the other hand, if the lessee agrees to maintain its own liabil-
ity insurance policy and to further indemnify the lessor against all
claims arising out of the use of the vehicle, then the lessor will be
entitled to full contractual indemnity against the lessee and its in-
surer. This is so even where the vehicle is negligently driven by an
employee of a sublessee who was covered under the lessor's own
policy of insurance." 0
In situations involving lessors and lessees, the Supreme Court of
Florida has made it abundantly clear that as long as the injured
party is protected as required by law from injuries caused by a
rented vehicle, the parties to the rental transaction are free to
agree by contract to place the burden of loss where they desire.14 1
III. CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY AGAINST TORT CLAIMS
Common law indemnity forms only one part of Florida's law of
tort indemnity. A significant number of tort indemnity claims arise
under indemnity agreements between the indemnitor and the in-
demnitee. It is therefore important to understand the principles of
law governing indemnity agreements.
A. Principles of Construction
The principal object of the construction of an indemnity con-
tract is to ascertain the intention of the parties and to effectuate
that intention consistently with legal principles.1 4 2 Unless a con-
trary result is dictated by some requirement of law, the parties are
free to allocate between themselves the risks of loss incident to
139. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 348 So. 2d 1149
(Fla. 1977).
140. See Truck Discount Corp. v. Serrano, 362 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
See also National Indem. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 345 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1977).
141. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 348 So. 2d 1149
(Fla. 1977). See also Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 368 So. 2d
1329 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979); American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Letherby Ins. Co., 350 So.
2d 353 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977). Cf. FLA. STAT. § 627.7263 (1979)(an automobile lessor's
liability or personal injury protection insurance shall be primary unless otherwise stated in
bold type on the face of the rental agreement).
142. See J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Zack Co., 232 So. 2d 447, 449 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.




In most cases, an express contract of indemnity will be in writing
and the intention of the parties will be determined by interpreting
the written instrument.' The construction of the written contract
will ordinarily be a question of a law to be decided by the court. In
such cases the issue may often be determined by summary judg-
ment.' 5 In construing the language of a written contract providing
indemnity, the indemnity provisions will be construed most
strongly against the party who drafted it.' 46
When a noninsurance indemnity agreement is reasonably sus-
ceptible to two interpretations, one of which will provide indem-
nity and one of which will deny it, there is a division of opinion as
to the proper rule of construction. The Third District Court of Ap-
peal held in Maule Industries, Inc. v. Central Digging & Con-
tracting Corp.47 that the contract must be interpreted to provide
indemnity. The third district relied upon the Florida Supreme
Court case of Da Costa v. General Guaranty Insurance Co."48
which involved an insurance contract, and upon the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision in Lake v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,' 49
which in turn relied upon Da Costa. The third district, therefore,
will apply the same principle of construction to a noninsurance
contract of indemnity as it will to an insurance contract of
indemnity.
However, the Second District Court of Appeal held in Sol
Walker & Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad6 0 that where a
noninsurance indemnity agreement is included in a contract, the
main purpose of which is not indemnity, an ambiguous indemnity
143. See Insurance Co. of North America v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 348 So. 2d 1149
(Fla. 1977); Truck Discount Corp. v. Serrano, 362 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
144. FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1979) requires "any special promise to answer for the debt,
default or miscarriage of another person or. . . any agreement that is not to be performed
within the space of 1 year from the making thereof" to be in writing and signed by the
person to be charged with the promise. An indemnitee should comply with this statute to
avoid an indemnitor's contention that an oral indemnity agreement is unenforceable as vio-
lative of the statute. See 72 AM. JUR. 2d Statute of Frauds §§ 19, 22, 237 (1974) for a
discussion of the application of the above statute of frauds to indemnity and insurance
contracts.
145. Kochan v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 200 So. 2d 213, 220 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1967).
146. See Sol Walker & Co. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 362 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); Lindquist v. Burklew, 123 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
147. 323 So. 2d 631, 632-33 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
148. 226 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1969).
149. 430 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1970).
150. 362 So. 2d 45, 48 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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clause must be construed strictly against the indemnitee. The
court in Sol Walker relied upon the Fifth Circuit case of Thomas
v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad,11 which did not rely upon any
Florida cases in reaching the above result. The Thomas case in-
volved a claim of indemnity by a railroad company against its
lessee. It was contended that the indemnity provision in question
was intended to apply to cases of willful or wanton misconduct. 52
The rule adopted by the Third District Court of Appeal in
Maule Industries, Inc., is the sounder rule. An indemnity agree-
ment that is reasonably susceptible to two interpretations should
be construed using the same principles in both insurance and non-
insurance indemnity agreements. No justification for inconsistent
principles of construction in the two situations is persuasive.
While the above principles of construction of indemnification
contracts may be determinative in a given case, they will merely
serve as aids to the construction of the agreement, not as a substi-
tute for it. The construction process as a whole is an effort to de-
termine the intent of the parties. A recent interesting example of
this process can be found in Misener Marine Construction Co. v.
Southport Marine, Inc.153 In that case, a contractor (Misener) and
a subcontractor (Southport) entered into a contract in which
Southport agreed to indemnify Misener against "all claims .. .
based upon or arising out of damages or injury to persons ... sus-
tained in connection with the performance of this Subcontract. ' ' 54
Misener furnished an employee to Southport under its contract
with Southport, which called for Misener to furnish a barge, a con-
crete truck with an operator, and a tug boat with an operator. This
loaned employee, who was the operator of the concrete truck, was
injured while operating a winch on the barge provided by Misener.
The employee sued both Misener and Southport, alleging negli-
gence in failing to provide a safe place to work and in failing to
keep the winch in proper repair, and also alleging strict liability in
failing to provide a seaworthy vessel.155 Both Misener and
Southport filed cross claims for indemnity. The employee's claims
were settled, with both Misener and Southport contributing one-
half of the settlement and both reserved the right to prosecute
151. 201 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1953).
152. Id. at 169.
153. 377 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
154. Id. at 758.
155. Id.
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their cross claims for indemnity. 5 "
In rejecting Misener's claim for contractual indemnity, the court
held as follows:
The obvious and logical intent of the indemnity clause was to
have Southport reimburse Misener for any loss sustained by Mis-
ener where injury to person or property arose out of duties to be
performed by Southport.... Thus, the only reasonable interpre-
tation of the subcontract as a whole would be that Southport was
not to be responsible for loss occurring to Misener from Misener's
duty under the lease clause. 157
The reach of the indemnity agreement was limited to the court's
narrow interpretation of the intent of the parties.
1. Intentional or Reckless Conduct
An important question to be determined in construing an in-
demnity agreement is whether the indemnity agreement is valid.
For reasons of public policy, one cannot be indemnified against his
own intentional, illegal, or immoral conduct. 18 Moreover, a tort-
feasor cannot be indemnified against his own reckless, willful, or
wanton conduct.
In Thomas v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad,5 9 the plaintiff
Thomas alleged that the defendant Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Company had set fire in a "willful, wanton and reckless" manner
to a pile of debris which was in close proximity to a building occu-
pied by Thomas. The plaintiff's building was located adjacent to a
railroad track and was leased from the railroad company.160 The
lease agreement between Thomas and the railroad company re-
quired Thomas to indemnify the railroad company against any
claim for damage to the building and its contents caused by the
negligence of the railroad company or otherwise. The railroad com-
pany contended that this indemnity provision was intended to in-
clude acts of willful and wanton misconduct as well as acts of ordi-
nary negligence. The court rejected this contention and held that
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS § 572 (1932); 41 AM. JUR. 2d Indemnity § 11 (1968). A
person likewise cannot insure against his intentional infliction of harm on another. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. Spreen, 343 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977). Leatherby Ins. Co. v.
Willoughby, 315 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
159. 201 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1953)(applying Florida law).
160. Id. at 168.
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even if the parties intended reckless conduct to be included within
the indemnity provision, it would be illegal as applied to such con-
duct because of the public policy prohibition of a party's indemni-
fication against his own willful, wanton or reckless misconduct.161
The indemnity clause also served as an ill-disguised exculpatory
clause, excusing the lessor for his negligence to his lessee.
2. Indemnitee's Negligence and Strict Liability
Although one may not contract for indemnity against his own
intentional or reckless misconduct, one may contract for indemnity
against one's own negligence or strict liability if the contract meets
certain requirements, even though such conduct will bar the right
to common law indemnity under Houdaille. In Charles Poe Ma-
sonry, Inc. v. Spring Lock Scaffolding Rental Equipment Co., 162 it
was alleged that the plaintiff, Arthur Lott, was injured when he fell
from a scaffold on a construction site. Spring Lock had manufac-
tured the scaffold and had leased it to the subcontractor (Poe),
which assembled it and used it on the construction project. Poe
agreed in the lease to maintain and use the scaffold in a reasonable
manner and to indemnify Spring Lock against any claim arising
out of the "erection and maintenance, use or possession of said
equipment."1 3
Lott sued Spring Lock on theories of negligence, breach of im-
plied warranty and strict liability. Spring Lock filed a third party
complaint against Poe for common law and contractual indemnity,
and also filed claims against the general contractor and the prop-
erty owner for common law indemnity.1 The Florida Supreme
Court held that there was no basis for Spring Lock's claims of
common law indemnity for the reasons express in Houdaille.165
The court then turned its attention to Spring Lock's claim
against Poe for contractual indemnity. Observing that "contracts
of indemnification which attempt to indemnify a party against its
own wrongful acts are viewed in Florida with disfavor,""6 the court
161. Id. at 169-70.
162. 374 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1979). For a very good discussion of cases involving attempts
by suppliers to obtain contractual indemnity against their own tortious conduct, see Mur-
ray, Indemnifying Suppliers Against Their Own Wrongs-Risk Allocation of Products Lia-
bility, 9 U.C.C. L. Joti. 203 (1977).
163. 374 So. 2d at 489.
164. Id. at 488.
165. Id. at 489.
166. Id.
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reaffirmed its earlier holding in University Plaza Shopping
Center, Inc. v. Stewart 67 and held that a contract of indemnifica-
tion will not be construed to include indemnity against the indem-
nitee's own negligence unless this intent is expressed in "clear and
unequivocal terms."' 8
In University Plaza, this principle of construction was applied
to preclude a landlord's claim of indemnity against a tenant who
agreed to indemnify his landlord against "any and all claims for
any personal injury or loss of life in and about the demised prem-
ises. ' ' " The landlord-indemnitee was allegedly solely negligent in
causing the death sued upon in University Plaza. The court left
open the question of whether general language of indemnity such
as that provided by the lessee could justify indemnity where the
loss resulted from the joint negligence of the indemnitee and
indemnitor.'1 0
Relying on Leonard L. Farber Co., Inc. v. Jaksch, the Third
District Court of Appeal in Spring Lock spoke to the question left
open in University Plaza, and held that the general language of
indemnity contained in the lease between Spring Lock and Poe
provided indemnity for damages caused by the joint negligence of
Poe and Spring Lock.17 2 The Florida Supreme Court reversed,
holding that an indemnification agreement will not be construed to
indemnify an indemnitee against his own negligence, whether it be
sole or joint with that of the indemnitor, unless the intent to pro-
vide such indemnity is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms
in the indemnification agreement.17 1
The court held the following provision in the agreement between
Poe and Spring Lock to be decisive: "The LESSEE assumes all
responsibility for claims asserted by any person whatever growing
out of the erection and maintenance, use or possession of said
equipment, and agrees to hold the COMPANY harmless from all
such claims. 1 7 4 With respect to this language, the court stated:
The underscored provision employs exactly the sort of "general
terms" which we held in University Plaza do not disclose an in-
167. 272 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1973).
168. 374 So. 2d at 489.
169. 272 So. 2d at 508-09.
170. Id. at 509.
171. 335 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
172. 358 So. 2d 84, 85 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), vacated, 374 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1979).
173. 374 So. 2d at 489.
174. Id.
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tention to indemnify for consequences arising from the wrongful
acts of the indemnitee. The language of the lease agreement dem-
onstrates nothing more than an undertaking by Poe to hold
Spring Lock harmless from any vicarious liability which might re-
sult from Poe's erection, maintenance or use of the scaffold. It
does not envision indemnity for Spring Lock's affirmative miscon-
duct, whether in connection with design and manufacture or erec-
tion, maintenance and use of the scaffold....
We are not unmindful of the fact that the majority in Univer-
sity Plaza limited its holding to instances where liability is based
solely on the fault of the indemnitee. However, the public policy
underlying that decision applies with equal force here, that is, to
instances where the indemnitor and indemnitee are jointly liable.
Under classical principles of indemnity, courts of law rightfully
frown upon the underwriting of wrongful conduct, whether it
stands alone or is accompanied by other wrongful acts....
Hence we extend the holding in University Plaza to cases where
the indemnitor and indemnitee are jointly liable. 75
The court's opinion does not specifically mention Spring Lock's
claim against Poe for indemnity based on Spring Lock's liability
for its alleged breach of warranty and for strict liability. 7 6 It seems
clear, however, that the court intended to include claims based
upon breach of warranty and strict liability within the words "af-
firmative misconduct." This conclusion is supported by the holding
in the case, which denied Spring Lock's claim for contractual in-
demnity against its own breach of warranty and strict liability.
Moreover, the court's construction of the general language of in-
demnity in the lease between Spring Lock and Poe as demonstrat-
ing "nothing more than an undertaking by Poe to hold Spring
Lock harmless from any vicarious liability" and as not including
"indemnity for Spring Lock's affirmative misconduct" seems
clearly to include breach of warranty or strict liability within the
term "affirmative misconduct." Therefore, the First District Court
of Appeal's holding in W.R. Fairchild Construction Co. v.
Fairchild-Florida Construction Co., 17 that general language of in-
demnity is sufficient to provide indemnity against an indemnitee's
strict liability, appears to have been overruled by Spring Lock.
In Spring Lock, the Florida Supreme Court distinguished Leo-
175. Id. at 489-90 (citation omitted).
176. Id. at 488.
177. 369 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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nard L. Farber Co. v. Jaksch'78 and approved its holding. In that
case the lease provided that "Lessee shall indemnify LESSOR and
save it harmless from suits . . . occasioned wholly or in part by
any act or omission of Lessee .... ,,"e The Spring Lock court
stated that the "in part" language manifested the lessee's clear and
unequivocal intent to indemnify the lessor in cases where both the
lessor and the lessee were at fault in causing the injury. This rea-
soning raises questions as to what kind of language will satisfy the
requirement that an intent to indemnify against one's own negli-
gence or strict liability be expressed in "clear and unequivocal
terms."
The lessee in Leonard L. Farber Co. argued that the "in part"
language meant any negligence of the lessee, together with the neg-
ligence of a third person, and did not include the negligence of the
lessor. Therefore, the lessee contended, there was no clear and une-
quivocal expression of an intent to indemnify the lessor when its
negligence joined with that of the lessee in causing the injury. If
the indemnity provision had only used the "in part" language
quoted above, the lessee's contention would seem to be very per-
suasive. There was, however, an addendum to the lease provision
in question, which stated that: "Anything contained in Paragraph
37 hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, Lessor shall not be re-
lieved of any liability resulting solely from the negligence of Lessor
or of its agents or employees."180 This language, when added to the
"in part" language referred to above, lends some support for find-
ing an intent that the lessor be indemnified by the lessee from
losses resulting from the joint negligence of the lessor and the
lessee.
The Florida Supreme Court's approval in Spring Lock of Leo-
nard L. Farber Co. makes it abundantly clear that language of in-
demnity can satisfy the requirement that an intent to indemnify
against one's own negligence or strict liability be expressed in clear
and unequivocal terms even if it does not use the words "indemni-
tee's negligence or strict liability" or "joint negligence or strict lia-
bility of the indemnitee and the indemnitor."
There is some question raised by the Florida Supreme Court's
express approval of the result in Leonard L. Farber Co. as to
whether it is easier to satisfy the clear and unequivocal terms re-
178. 335 So. 2d at 847-48.
179. Id. at 848 (emphasis added).
180. Id.
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quirement when the indemnitee is seeking indemnity against his
joint negligence or joint strict liability rather than his sole negli-
gence or sole strict liability. Support for such a distinction might
be found in the First District Court of Appeal decision in City of
Jacksonville v. Franco.'"8 This case held that an indemnity provi-
sion did not sufficiently express a clear and unequivocal intent to
indemnify against the indemnitee's sole negligence but did suffi-
ciently express a clear and unequivocal intent to indemnify him
against his contributing negligence. 182 Since the reasons for adopt-
ing the "clear and unequivocal terms" requirement are less com-
pelling where joint negligence or strict liability is involved, a more
relaxed standard of construction with regard to this situation could
be justified.1 83 Spring Lock, however, does not appear to recognize
such a distinction.
The "clear and unequivocal terms" requirement discussed in
Spring Lock has been applied in a number of cases to deny indem-
nity against an indemnitee's own negligence. It has been held that
an indemnification agreement providing indemnity against "any
and all claims for any personal injury or loss of life in and about
the demised premises;" 184 "all liability. . imposed by law . . . on
account of any such loss, damage, or injury;"1 " "shall and will at
all times indemnify and save harmless . . . and will pay and dis-
charge all loss;"1 8 or "any liabilities whatsoever"1 7 will be con-
strued as insufficient to show a clear and unequivocal intent to
provide indemnity against an indemnitee's own negligence.
Similarly, a contract of indemnity which provides that the in-
demnitor agrees to indemnify the indemnitee against "all losses
and all claims, demands, payments, suits, actions, recoveries, and
judgments of every nature and description brought. . . by reason
181. 361 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
182. Id. at 211-12.
183. General language of indemnity was held to sufficiently support an indemnitee's
claim of indemnity against its joint negligence in Mutual Employees Trademart, Inc. v. Ar-
mour Serv., Inc., 170 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964). This case seems inconsistent
with Spring Lock, however, and is probably no longer valid.
184. University Plaza Shopping Center, Inc. v. Stewart, 272 So. 2d 507, 508-09 (Fla.
1973).
185. Ivey Plants, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 282 So. 2d 205, 209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
186. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 196 So. 2d 456, 457 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 1967).
187. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Elmore, 189 So. 2d 522, 523 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1966); Nat Harrison Assoc., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 162 So. 2d 298, 300 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 166 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 1964). See also Leadership Hous. Sys., Inc.
v. T & S Elec., Inc., No. 78-1480, 25 FLA. L.W. 1147 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. June 11, 1980).
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of any act or omission of the said contractor, his agent, or any em-
ployee in the execution of the work in consequence of any negli-
gence or carelessness in guarding same" will not be construed to
provide indemnity against an indemnitee's own negligence.188
The simple lesson for the draftsman who wishes to be sure that
an indemnitee will be indemnified against his own negligence or
strict liability, whether sole or joint, is to use the words "negli-
gence" or "strict liability" when expressing the desired intent.189
C. Abandonment or Other Termination of a Written
Indemnification Agreement
The parties to an indemnification agreement may, of course, mu-
tually agree to terminate the agreement. They may also abandon
the agreement by their conduct. In Sinclair Refining Co. v. But-
ler,190 the Third District Court of Appeal held that evidence of a
course of conduct by the parties over a period in excess of thirty
years supported a jury finding that the parties had abandoned the
written agreements between themselves, including the convenants
of indemnity.
An indemnitor, however, who executes an indemnity agreement
on behalf of a principal and in favor of a surety cannot unilaterally
terminate his obligations under the indemnity agreement. Al-
though the indemnitor's motive for undertaking the indemnity ob-
ligation may no longer exist, he still remains liable under the terms
of the indemnity agreement.19'
IV. STATUTES AFFECTING INDEMNITY
The principles of contractual and common law indemnity dis-
cussed in the preceding two sections of this article are subject, of
course, to statutory modification. The Florida legislature has en-
acted several statutes affecting the right to obtain indemnity
against liability for tort claims. These statutes must be examined
to determine whether they affect a claim for indemnity against tort
188. Walter Taft Bradshaw & Assoc. v. Bedsole, 374 So. 2d 644, 647 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1979). See also Bankhead Welding Serv., Inc. v. Florida East Coast Ry., 240 So. 2d 648
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970). Other jurisdictions also apply a strict constructive rule where
the indemnitee seeks indemnity against his own negligence. See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v.
Glaros, 230 N.E.2d 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967).
189. See, e.g., Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 374 So. 2d 57 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
190. See 172 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
191. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Buchanan, 369 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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liability.
A. Construction Contracts
Indemnity agreements contained in construction contracts must
comply with the requirements of section 725.06, Florida Stat-
utes. 9' This statute states that a construction contract which pro-
vides indemnity is not enforceable unless the contract contains a
monetary limitation on the amount of indemnity and the indemni-
tee gives specific consideration for the indemnity.
This statutory provision was recently applied in the case of A-T-
0, Inc. v. Garcia95 to invalidate an indemnity provision printed on
the reverse side of a receipt issued in connection with the lease of a
portable mobile scaffold for construction work. This receipt pur-
ported to require the lessee to indemnify the lessor against the
consequences of the lessor's own negligence. The indemnity provi-
sion contained neither a monetary limitation nor gave any specific
consideration for the indemnification.'" In Maule Industries, Inc.
v. Central Rigging & Contracting Corp.,95 however, the Third Dis-
trict Court of Appeal found that the statute had been complied
with and that the indemnity agreement was valid. The Florida Su-
preme Court decision in Spring Lock did not mention the statute.
B. Indemnity of Corporate Officers, Directors, Employees and
Agents
A corporate officer, director, employee or agent may become sub-
192. (1979). The entire section is as follows:
Any portion of any agreement or contract for, or in connection with, any con-
struction, alteration, repair, or demolition of a building, structure, appurtenance,
or appliance, including moving and excavating connected with it, or any guarantee
of, or in connection with, any of them, between an owner of real property and an
architect, engineer, general contractor, subcontractor, sub-subcontractor, or mate-
rialman, or between any combination thereof, wherein any party referred to herein
obtains indemnification from liability for damages to persons or property caused
in whole or in part by any act, omission, or default of that party arising from the
contract or its performance shall be void and unenforceable unless:
(1) The contract contains a monetary limitation on the extent of the idemnifi-
cation and shall be a part of the project specifications or bid documents, if any, or
(2) The person indemnified by the contract gives a specific consideration to
the indemnitor for the indemnification that shall be provided for in his contract
and section of the project specifications or bid documents, if any.
FLA. STAT. § 725.06 (1979).
193. 374 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
194. Id. at 536.
195. 323 So. 2d 631, 632 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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ject to tort as well as to other liability for his actions in represent-
ing the corporation. The corporation may wish to indemnify its of-
ficers, directors, employees and agents against such liability,
including the attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending such
actions. Such corporate indemnity agreements must comply with
the extensive provisions of section 607.014, Florida Statutes.1"6
A corporation may indemnify a director, officer, employee or
agent for expenses, judgments, fines or settlements only if the per-
son acted in "good faith" and in a manner reasonably believed to
be in the best interest of the corporation. In a criminal action, in-
demnity will only be allowed if the person had no reasonable cause
to believe that his conduct was unlawful. The court in which the
action against the corporate director, officer, employee or agent
was brought must approve any corporate indemnity for the per-
son's adjudicated negligence or misconduct. The statute also pro-
hibits a corporation from providing indemnification against "gross
negligence" or "willful misconduct. 1 97
C. Landlord and Tenant
With respect to residential tenancies governed by the Florida
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,198 no indemnity agreement
will be valid if its violates the provisions of section 83.47 of this
act, which prohibits the enforcement of any clause in a rental
agreement which limits a landlord's liability to the tenant, or vice
versa. 199
D. Suits for Indemnity and Contribution Against
the State, Its Agencies or Subdivisions
A private defendant sued by an injured person may wish to as-
196. (1979).
197. FLA. STAT. §§ 607.014(1), (2), (4), (6) (1979).
198. FLA. STAT. §§ 83.40-.63 (1979).
199. FLA. STAT. § 83.47 (1979) provides:
(1) A provision in a rental agreement is void and unenforceable to the extent
that it:
(a) Purports to waive or preclude the rights, remedies, or requirements set
forth in this part.
(b) Purports to limit or preclude any liability of the landlord to the tenant or
of the tenant to the landlord, arising under law.
(2) If such a void and unenforceable provision is included in a rental agree-
ment entered into, extended, or renewed after the effective date of this part and
either party suffers actual damages as a result of the inclusion, the aggrieved party
may recover those damages sustained after the effective date of this part.
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sert a claim for tort indemnity or contribution against the state or
its agencies or subdivisions. If so, the defendant must comply with
the requirements of the legislative enactment which waives the
state's right of sovereign immunity for tort claims against the
state, its agencies or subdivisions.20 0 The Florida Supreme Court
has held that this statute applies to indemnity actions based on
the tortious conduct of the state, its agencies or subdivisions.20 1 As
the court stated, "Actions for contribution or indemnity grounded
on the tortious conduct of the state or its agencies and subdivisions
are no less tort claims for purposes of section 768.28 than direct
actions. 2 2
V. INDEMNITEE'S ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
A. Attorney's Fees and Costs as Part of Indemnitee's Damages
In Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Postol, which involved a claim
for common law indemnity, the Third District Court of Appeal
quoted with approval the following rule:
As a general rule an indemnitee is entitled to recover, as a part of
the damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and reasonable and
proper legal costs and expenses, which he is compelled to pay as a
result of suits by or against him in reference to the matter against
which he is indemnified. ... 203
Postol was applied to a contractual indemnity claim in Thomas
200. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1979). Before one may sue the state or one of its agencies or
subdivisions, one must present the claim in writing to the agency or subdivision and also,
except when the claim is against a municipality, to the Department of Insurance. After the
denial of the claim by either the agency or by the Department of Insurance, the claimant
may file the action in court. If neither the agency nor the department responds to the claim
within six months, the claim is deemed denied. Id. at § 768.28(6). It is important to note
that the four-year statute of limitations begins to run from the time that the claim "ac-
crues" and does not appear to be tolled by the filing of the claim with the appropriate state
agency or subdivision. It is only tolled by "filing a complaint in the court of appropriate
jurisdiction." Id. at § 768.28(11).
201. Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1022 (Fla. 1979).
Contractual indemnity actions against the state may be subject to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. See Circuit Court v. Department of Natural Resources, 339 So. 2d 1113, 1116
(Fla. 1976); Venezia A., Inc. v. Askew, 363 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); State ex
rel. Div. of Administration v. Oliff, 350 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
202. Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1022 (Fla. 1979).
203. 142 So. 2d 299, 300 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1962)(quoting 42 C.J.S. Indemnity §
13(d) (1944)(footnotes omitted)). See also Stevenson Ins. Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 228 So. 2d
118 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
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Awning & Tent Co. v. Toby's Twelfth Cafeteria, Inc.2 0 " Thomas
Awning extended this rule to include the indemnitee's reasonable
attorney's fees and costs incurred in successfully defending against
the injured person's appeal from a summary judgment in favor of
the indemnitee.
The lease in Thomas Awning provided that Toby's Cafeteria,
Inc. agreed to hold lessor Thomas Awning "harmless from any loss
or claims for damages and/or injuries while leased merchandise is
in the possession of" lessee Toby's Cafeteria, Inc.2 0 5 There was.no
express mention of attorney's fees and costs in the indemnity
agreement. The court held that Thomas Awning was entitled to
recover its attorney's fees and costs involved in the successful de-
fense at both the trial and appellate levels of the suit brought
against it by the injured person. This holding was based on the
reasoning in the Postol case that an indemnitee's damages include
its attorney's fees and costs expended in defending the action
against it.2 6
This reasoning is sound. In its second amended complaint which
was dismissed by the trial court, however, Thomas Awning further
claimed the right to recover attorney's fees and costs incurred as a
result of the institution of the indemnity action itself. The district
court did not explicitly state whether this latter claim was proper.
It simply cited the above-quoted language in Postol and reversed
the dismissal of the second amended complaint, creating the clear
impression that such attorney's fees and costs are recoverable.
There is language is the quoted portion of the Postol case which
supports the proposition that an indemnitee who sues the indem-
nitor may recover his attorney's fees and costs incurred in that
suit. In Postol, the court stated that an indemnitee can recover at-
torney's fees and costs "which he is compelled to pay as a result of
suits by or against him in reference to the matter against which he
is indemnified. ' 20 7 A suit brought by an indemnitee could include a
suit brought by the indemnitee against the indemnitor to recover
indemnity. It most likely, however, refers to actions brought by the
indemnitee against the injured third party, such as an action for a
204. 204 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967). This decision was disapproved on other
grounds in University Plaza Shopping Center, Inc. v. Stewart, 272 So. 2d 507, 512 (Fla.
1973). See also Morse Auto Rentals, Inc. v. Dunes Enterprises, Inc., 198 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
205. 204 So. 2d at 757.
206. Id.
207. 142 So. 2d at 300 (emphasis added).
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declaratory judgment.
An examination of the indemnity provision in Thomas Awning
reveals that it confers indemnity against "any loss or claims for
damages." Attorney's fees and costs expended in defending against
"any loss or claims for damages" fit properly into the indemnitee's
damages which result from the occurrence of the incident giving
rise to the right to indemnity. However, attorney's fees and costs
expended in enforcing the indemnity contract are not "in refer-
ence" to the "loss or claims for damages" but rather result from
the enforcement of the contractual indemnity provision itself.
Therefore, unless there is a further provision that grants the in-
demnitee the right to recover attorney's fees and costs incurred in
enforcing the indemnity provision, then such fees and costs should
not be recoverable. A federal case, applying Florida law, has
reached this conclusion.20 8
If the foregoing analysis is correct, it throws doubt upon the va-
lidity of the decision in Brown v. Financial Indemnity Co.209 In
that case, the Financial Indemnity Company sued the defendants
in county court to recover under an indemnification agreement.
The county court granted a judgment on the pleadings, thus deny-
ing the indemnity claim. The indemnitee appealed the county
court's decision to the circuit court, which reversed the county
court's holding and further held that the indemnitee was entitled
to recover its attorney's fees for the appeal, if the indemnitee
should prevail on the merits in the trial court. 10 The indemnitors
appealed the circuit court's order to the Fourth District Court of
Appeal.
The indemnitors contended that since the indemnification agree-
ment did not specifically provide for attorney's fees incurred on
appeal, they were not recoverable. As support, the indemnitors
cited cases which held that unless a statute or promissory note spe-
cifically provides for attorney's fees incurred on appeal, such attor-
ney's fees are not recoverable." The court rejected this contention
on the ground that Postol and Thomas Awning had determined
that attorney's fees and costs are part of an indemnitee's dam-
ages.21 2 The difficulty with this reasoning is that it interprets the
208. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., 465 F.2d 710, 716 (5th Cir.
1972).
209. 366 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
210. Id. at 1273.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1274.
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language in Postol to include the indemnitee's attorney's fees in-
curred in enforcing the indemnification agreement as a part of the
indemnitee's damages. 18
B. Procedural Effect of the Principle that an Indemnitee's
Attorney's Fees and Costs are Part of His Damages
in an Indemnity Action
The principle that the attorney's fees and costs incurred in de-
fending an injured third party's claim against an indemnitee are
part of the indemnitee's damages has procedural as well as sub-
stantive consequences. It has been held in nonindemnity contract
cases that a provision entitling the prevailing party to recover at-
torney's fees incurred in enforcing the contract establishes the
right to recover attorney's fees as part of the prevailing party's
damages. Where a jury trial has been demanded, the jury must de-
termine attorney's fees as it would determine any other element of
damages. 1' If the party entitled to recover attorney's fees incurred
in enforcing a contract fails to produce evidence to the jury on the
issue of fees, he waives his right to attorney's fees.2 15 This rule
would apply in a nonjury trial when attorney's fees and costs are to
be determined by the judge as trier of fact of an element of
damages.""
The same result should follow in trials upon claims for indem-
nity. Since an indemnitee's attorney's fees and costs incurred in
defending the third party's claim are a part of his damages, the
evidence on this issue must be presented to the trier of fact or the
right to recover such attorney's fees and costs will be waived. It
may be to the mutual advantage of the parties, however, to stipu-
late that this issue be resolved by the judge in a subsequent non-
jury hearing after the jury or nonjury trial has been concluded.
The rule that the trier of fact shall determine the issue of the
reasonable attorney's fees and costs which an indemnitee is enti-
213. FLA. STAT. § 59.46 (1979) provides that a statute or contract providing for payment
of attorney's fees shall be construed to include attorney's fees incurred on appeal. This ap-
plies only to contracts entered into after October 1, 1977, unless a contrary intent is
expressed.
214. See Riess v. Goldman, 196 So. 2d 184 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Ronlee, Inc. v.
P.M. Walker Co., 129 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
215. See Newcombe v. South Fla. Business Negotiators, Inc., 340 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
216. If the indemnitee fails to present evidence of attorney's fees and costs in his case-
in-chief in a non jury trial, he may file a motion within 10 days after the judgment is en-
tered to allow presentation of such evidence. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.530(a), (b).
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tled to recover in an indemnity action cannot be subverted by in-
serting a clause into the indemnity agreement which requires the
trier of fact to accept the indemnitee's evidence on the issue. In
Sork v. United Benefit Fire Insurance Co., 2  the court held that
an indemnity clause that provided, in part, that "all vouchers or
agreements for expenses or liabilities incurred by the surety in
good faith . . . including attorneys' fees . . . shall be accepted as
conclusive evidence" was invalid as contrary to public policy.118
Moreover, it was also held in Sork that the reasonableness of the
attorney's fees cannot be decided by summary judgment based
upon affidavits; the trier of fact must decide this issue.2 19
C. Indemnitee's Right to Attorney's Fees and Costs
After Settlement or Successful Defense
An indemnitee may settle with the third party and obtain a dis-
missal of the action with prejudice, in favor of both indemnitee
and indemnitor. In such a case, the indemnitee has a right to re-
cover attorney's fees and costs in defending the action up to the
point of its dismissal, unless the indemnitor and the indemnitee
agree to the contrary.22 0
An indemnitee who refuses to settle the third party's action and
elects to defend the action may also recover reasonable attorney's
fees and costs incurred in a successful defense. This is true
whether the indemnitee's right to indemnity is based upon con-
tractual221 or common law indemnity.2'2 An indemnitee claiming
indemnity under an indemnification agreement will only be enti-
tled to recover attorney's fees and costs in successfully defending a
third party's claim, however, if the third party's claim is covered
by the indemnification agreement.228
In J. A. Jones Construction Co. v. Zack Co., 224 a hurricane dam-
aged the roof and siding of an airplane hangar which had been con-
structed by a subcontractor. The contract contained a provision in
which the subcontractor agreed to indemnify the general contrac-
217. 161 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
218. Id. at 56.
219. Id.
220. See Postol v. Singer, 159 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
221. See Mutual Employees Trademart, Inc. v. Armour Serv., Inc., 170 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
222. See Pender v. Skillcraft Indus., Inc., 358 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
223. See J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Zack Co., 232 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
224. Id. at 447.
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tor against claims "arising from accidents" which occurred "in con-
nection with the subcontractor's work."225 The owner of the hangar
filed an action against the general contractor for the damage, alleg-
ing that the subcontractor's negligence had caused it. The general
contractor successfully defended the owner's action and then sued
the subcontractor under the indemnification provision quoted
above to recover its attorney's fees and costs. 20 The court held
that the damage caused by the hurricane was an "accidental hap-
pening" within the meaning of the indemnification provision and
therefore the general contractor was entitled to recover its attor-
ney's fees and costs. 227
In Stephens v. Chevron Oil Co., 2 18 a claimant sued a contractor
in connection with work being performed by a subcontractor. It
was alleged that the claimant's injuries were caused by the sole
negligence of the contractor. The contractor successfully defended
this claim and then sued the subcontractor to recover its attorney's
fees and costs under an indemnification agreement. In this agree-
ment, the subcontractor had agreed to indemnify the contractor
against losses arising in connection with work performed by the
subcontractor.229 The Fifth Circuit held that the contractor was
entitled to recover its attorney's fees and costs under the indemni-
fication agreement because the third party's claim arose in connec-
tion with the subcontractor's work. The court reached this result
even though it recognized that no right to indemnity would have
been allowed if the contractor had been negligent because the
"clear and unequivocal terms" requirement of Florida law had not
been met.2 30
D. Indemnitee Has No Right to Attorney's Fees and Costs
of Defending Claims Not Covered in the Indemnity
Agreement or When Indemnity Is Precluded by
Public Policy
Where the indemnification agreement is construed as not cover-
ing a claim against the indemnitor, the indemnitee will, of course,
be denied any recovery against the indemnitor for attorney's fees
225. Id.
226. Id. at 448.
227. Id. at 449.
228. 517 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1975).
229. Id. at 1124.
230. Id. at 1125.
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and costs incurred in defending the third party's claim.2 81
Moreover, in Cohen v. Commodore Plaza at Century 21 Condo-
minium Association232 it was held that a condominium association
was not liable for attorney's fees expended by a developer-lessor in
its successful defense of a federal action brought by individual con-
dominium unit owners to invalidate a lease between the developer
and the condominium association. The indemnification agreement
sought to be enforced was contained in the lease attacked in the
federal action as violating the federal anti-trust laws. The court
held that the interests of the individual condominium unit owners
were aligned with those of the condominium association. There-
fore, the strong public policy in favor of encouraging filing of pri-
vate suits under the federal antitrust laws was held to preclude the
awarding of attorney's fees to successful defendants in such
actions.3 3
VI. PLEADING THE RIGHT TO INDEMNITY
A cause of action for indemnity must be pled in accordance with
the requirements of the rules of procedure which govern civil ac-
tions generally. 3 4 If the indemnity action is based upon a written
agreement, the agreement should be attached to the complaint.'3 6
If the indemnitee is asserting indemnity in a cross claim or in a
third party complaint filed in the action brought against the in-
demnitee by a third person, the indemnitee will not be bound by
an adversary's allegations describing his conduct. If the complaint
for indemnity is properly pled, the right to indemnity will be de-
termined by the proof as to those allegations at trial.3 If, how-
231. See Misener Marine Constr. Co. v. Southport Marine, Inc., 377 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979); See also Davis v. Air Tech. Indus., Inc., 148 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1978), in
which the court stated that: "Accordingly, in ordinary products liability cases, a manufac-
turer is not liable for attorney's fees incurred by an indemnified party solely in defense of
alleged wrongdoing on its part. Since Davis defended exclusively against allegations of his
own negligence, he is not entitled to recover attorney's fees." Id. at 421-22 (footnotes
omitted).
232. 368 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
233. Id. at 614.
234. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.110.
235. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.130.
236. See American Home Assurance Co. v. City of Opa Locka, 368 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Barnett Bank v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1978); First Church of Christ Scientist v. City of St. Petersburg, 344 So. 2d
1302 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Insurance Co. of North America v. King, 340 So. 2d 1175
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Bodin Apparel, Inc. v. Superior Steam Serv., Inc., 328 So. 2d
533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Central Truck Lines, Inc., v. White Motor Corp., 316 So.
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ever, the indemnitee fails to allege an ultimate fact necessary to
support his claim for indemnity"' or pleads facts which are incon-
sistent with his right to indemnity,"'8 his claim is subject to
dismissal.
VII. THIRD PARTY PRACTICE AND THE EFFECT OF A JUDGMENT OR
SETTLEMENT IN THE THIRD PARTY'S SUIT
Although a cause of action for indemnity does not generally ac-
crue for purposes of the statute of limitations until the indemnitee
has paid or otherwise satisfied the third party's claim, the rules of
third party practice allow an indemnity action to be accelerated to
permit the third party's claim and the indemnitee's claim to be
resolved in one suit.2'3
The indemnitee may therefore file a cross claim against the in-
demnitor if both the indemnitor and the indemnitee have been
joined as defendants in the third party's suit against them.240 If the
indemnitor has not been joined in the third party's action as a
party defendant, the indemnitee may implead the indemnitor as a
third party defendant in the action.241 The advantage to the in-
demnitee of asserting his claim for indemnity in the third party's
action is that his liability and his right to indemnity will be re-
solved in one suit instead of two. He may then arrange to levy
upon the indemnitor or to assign his claim in discharge of his lia-
bility to the judgment creditor, thereby avoiding impairment of his
own estate or insurance coverage.
The indemnitee, however, may be unable or unwilling to implead
the indemnitor in the primary action. If such is the case, the in-
demnitee should consider whether it is allowable to "vouch in" the
indemnitor. This simply means that the indemnitee may give the
2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
237. See, e.g., Armor Elevator Co. v. Elevator Sales & Serv., Inc., 309 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
238. See, e.g., Berenson v. World Jai-Alai, Inc., 374 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App.
1979).
239. See Mims Crane Serv., Inc. v. Insley Mfg. Corp., 226 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1969); Chappell v. Scarborough, 224 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1969). The
indemnitee may assert his claim for indemnity against the indemnitor by filing an original
action against the indemnitor. See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Florida Power & Light Co.,
222 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
240. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.170(g).
241. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.180. See Mt. Sinai Hosp. v. Mora, 342 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1977). Impleader cannot be used by the indemnitee, however, to force the plaintiff
to join the indemnitor as a party defendant in the action. See, e.g., Fincher Motor Sales,
Inc. v. Lakin, 156 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
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indemnitor reasonable notice of the pendency of the third party's
suit and request the indemnitor to defend the suit. After doing
that, any judgment entered against the indemnitee (absent fraud
or collusion) will be res judicata as to the indemnitor. In the subse-
quent indemnity action, therefore, the indemnitee will then only
have to prove the remaining issues necessary to establish his right
to indemnity.2 42 In addition to the common law doctrine allowing
an indemnitee to "vouch in" the indemnitor, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code provides for such a procedure between buyers and
sellers. 43
If the indemnitee does not implead the indemnitor or give him
notice of the pendency of the suit and request him to defend it,
then the judgment in the primary action will not bind the non-
party indemnitor through res judicata. The indemnitee will be re-
quired in his subsequent indemnity action to prove his actual lia-
bility to the third party.2 "
A. Effect of a Settlement of the Primary Claim
Upon a Subsequent Indemnity Action
Instead of litigating his liability to the primary claimant, the in-
demnitee may wish to settle. Where the indemnitee gives the in-
demnitor reasonable notice of the pendency of the suit and re-
quests him to defend it, but the indemnitor refuses to do so, the
indemnitee may establish his liability to the third party in his ac-
tion for indemnity by proving his potential liability to the third
party and the reasonableness of the settlement. 45
However, where the indemnitee settles the third party's action
without having previously "vouched in" or notified the indemnitor,
evidence of the reasonableness of the settlement will be inadmissi-
242. See Morris v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 538 (5th Cir. 1974); Olin's Rent-A-
Car Sys., Inc. v. Royal Continental Hotels, Inc., 187 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1966); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. J.C. Penney, Inc., 166 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1964); Wright v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 139 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1962); RESTATE-
MENT OF JUDGMENTS § 107 (1942); 42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 32 (1944). See generally Robbins v.
Chicago City, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 657 (1866); Chicago City v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418
(1862); City of Detroit v. Grant, 98 N.W. 405 (Mich. 1904); 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
14.021 (2d ed. 1974). See also Columbia Cas. Co. v. Hare, 156 So. 370 (Fla. 1934), which
applied the same rule to a surety company notified of an action against its insured.
243. See FLA. STAT. § 672.607(5) (1979).
244. See MacArthur v. Gaines, 286 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973). See also
Martinique Shoes, Inc. v. New York Progressive Wood Heel Co., 217 A.2d 781 (Pa. 1966).
245. Tankrederiet Gefion v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 406 F.2d 1039, 1042 (6th Cir. 1969).
TORT INDEMNITY
ble to prove the indemnitee's liability to the third party.246 Also,
where the indemnitee has impleaded the indemnitor in the pri-
mary action and has thereafter settled with the plaintiff without
the indemnitor's approval and without first tendering him the de-
fense of the action in exchange for a "hold harmless" agreement,
the indemnitee will be required to prove his actual liability to the
third party in order to establish his right to indemnity.2 47 Where,
on the other hand, the indemnitee's tender of the defense of the
suit to the indemnitor in exchange for a "hold harmless" agree-
ment is refused by the indemnitor, the indemnitee may settle with
the plaintiff and will be allowed in the subsequent indemnity ac-
tion to prove his liability to the plaintiff by showing his potential
liability to the plaintiff and the reasonabless of the settlement.2 48
B. Res Judicata Effect of a Judgment in a Primary Action
When the Co-Party Indemnitor and Indemnitee Did
Not Litigate Issues of Indemnity
The indemnitee and the indemnitor who have been made party
defendants in an action brought by the primary claimant may de-
fend the basic claim together without litigating the issue of indem-
nity between themselves. In such a case, a question may arise as to
what effect a judgment rendered in the third party's action against
them will have on a subsequent indemnity action between them. In
Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,2 49 Uni-
versal Underwriters sought indemnity from Ford on the theory of
breach of implied warranty. In a previous action, Universal Under-
writer's insured had been sued by a person injured by a motor ve-
hicle owned and operated by the insured's employee and pur-
chased by the insured from Ford. The insured was sued for either
negligently failing to discover a defect in the brakes of the vehicle
or for negligently failing to repair the brakes after discovery of the
defect. The jury entered a general verdict against the insured, find-
ing negligence. Ford was also a defendant in this action on the the-
ory of negligent manufacture of the brakes, but was found not lia-
ble for negligence. No indemnity claim was asserted against Ford
246. Id. at 1042-43. But see Morris v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 538 (5th Cir.
1974), in which the court stated, "The absence of any such Voucher/Notice puts a heavy
burden of evidentiary proof on one asserting the (i) existence of serious exposure to substan-
tial liability and (ii) the reasonableness of the settlement." Id. at 543.
247. Tankrederiet Gefion v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 406 F.2d 1039, 1042 (6th Cir. 1969).
248. Id. at 1043.
249. 264 F. Supp. 757 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
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in the third party action.5 0
The issue of whether the insured's negligence was active or pas-
sive in character and the issue of whether Ford breached its im-
plied warranty to the insured were not litigated between Ford and
its co-defendant, the insured in the original tort action. The court
in Universal Underwriters held that since these issues were not
litigated in the original action, the judgment entered therein did
not bar litigation of these issues in a subsequent indemnity action,
even though the general jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff had
established negligence of some kind on the part of the insured.2 51
A different result might be reached in the above case under the
reasoning in Billman v. Nova Products, Inc.,25 2 discussed below, if
the jury specifically finds that the indemnitee is guilty of conduct
which disqualifies him from receiving indemnity, even though the
issue has not been litigated between the indemnitee and the in-
demnitor in the original tort action.
C. Effect on Rights of Original Claimant Where Indemnitee
and Indemnitor Litigate Indemnity Issues in
Third Party's Action
Where the issue of breach of implied warranty is litigated be-
tween the indemnitor and the indemnitee in the principal tort ac-
tion, it has been held that the judgment rendered on the cross
claim will not only conclusively resolve the issue of indemnity, but
will also bind the original claimant. In Billman, the injured plain-
tiff sued a retailer for breach of implied warranty. The retailer im-
pleaded the manufacturer and alleged breach of implied warranty.
The plaintiff obtained a judgment of $26,000.00 against the re-
tailer, and the retailer received a judgment over against the manu-
facturer in the same amount. The plaintiff then refused to accept
payment of his judgment against the retailer and sued the manu-
facturer for breach of implied warranty.253 The First District Court
of Appeal held that his suit was barred by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel and stated:
In cases involving the relationship of indemnitor and indemnitee,
liability of more than one party is dependent upon identical is-
sues. In such situations, when the complaining party has a full
250. Id. at 758.
251. Id. at 759.
252. 328 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
253. Id. at 244-46.
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opportunity to litigate these issues against one of the parties, and
has obtained a favorable judgment, he is not permitted to reliti-
gate the same issues in a new action against the other party.2 4
The court in Billman further held that the retailer and the man-
ufacturer (indemnitee and indemnitor) were not joint tortfeasors
for purposes of the rule which allows a plaintiff to obtain a judg-
ment against one joint tortfeasor, refuse satisfaction of the judg-
ment, and then attempt to obtain a higher judgment against the
other tortfeasor in a subsequent action.2" On this point, the court
in Billman relied upon the holding in Phillips v. Hall2' that where
the plaintiff who sues an employer based upon his vicarious liabil-
ity for the negligence of his employee and recovers a judgment
against him is barred by res judicata from bringing a subsequent
suit against the employee for the same injuries arising from the
same accident.
VIII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR INDEMNITY CLAIMS
An action for indemnity based upon a written indemnification
agreement must generally be brought within five years after the
commencement of the cause of action,57 and other claims for in-
demnity must be brought within four years from the date of ac-
crual of the cause of action.2 s If the claim for indemnity is against
the state, its agencies or subdivisions, the party claiming indem-
nity must additionally comply with section 768.28(6), Florida Stat-
utes,3" by presenting his claim in writing to the appropriate
agency and, except for a claim against a municipality, to the De-
partment of Insurance within three years after the claim accrues.
As previously noted, this statute applies to actions for indemnity
grounded on the tortious conduct of a Florida governmental
entity.2 0
Since the statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of
action for indemnity accrues, it is important to know when this
occurs. In Mims Crane Service, Inc. v. Insley Manufacturing
254. Id. at 246.
255. Id.
256. 297 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
257. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(2)(b) (1979).
258. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(f),(k),(p) (1979).
259. (1979).
260. Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1022 (Fla. 1979).
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Corp.,2 6 the Second District Court of Appeal held that a cause of
action for indemnity accrues when the litigation against the indem-
nitee "has ended or the liability, if any, has been settled or dis-
charged by payment." In one of the patterns covered by the Mims
test, the indemnitee has been held liable to an injured third per-
son. In this case, the cause of action for indemnity arises when the
indemnitee pays or otherwise satisfies the judgment or debt.2 6 2 The
other situation to which Mirs would apply is where the indemni-
tee is successful in defending the third party's claim against him,
and is entitled to recover indemnity for his reasonable attorney's
fees and costs. In this case, the cause of action arises when the
third party's litigation has ended.2 5 In Continental Casualty Co.
v. Florida Power & Light Co., 2 " the court held, in allowing the
indemnity claim, that the third party's action against Florida
Power and Light Company had ended when the jury rendered its
verdict, since no appeal was taken, and that Florida Power's cause
of action for indemnity to recover attorney's fees and costs in de-
fending the action accrued at that time.6
Further amplification on this issue can be found in Employers'
Fire Insurance Co. v. Continental Insurance Co. 2" In this case,
the trial judge entered his findings in a nonjury trial in the trial
court's minute book, but he did not enter a formal final judgment
from which an appeal could have been taken until eleven months
later. The court held that the statute of limitations on the contract
claim asserted in the action began to run when the minute book
entry was made.6
261. 226 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
262. The holding in Mires was approved by the Florida Supreme Court in Employers'
Fire Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 326 So. 2d 177, 180 (Fla. 1976). See also Pender v.
Skillcraft Indus., Inc., 358 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); New Hampshire Ins. Co.
v. Petrik, 343 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Gaines v. MacArthur, 254 So. 2d 8
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971). The same rule applies to contribution claims. Lopez v. Lopez,
90 So. 2d 456, 459 (Fla. 1956).
263. 226 So. 2d at 840.
264. 222 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
265. Id. at 59.
266. 326 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1976).
267. Id. at 181. In its opinion the court stated as follows:
Statutes of limitations are enacted to bar claims which have been dormant for a
number of years and which have not been enforced by persons entitled to enforce-
ment. To allow that time period to be expanded by the interval between a final
adjudication of liability containing all of the information necessary to establish
the enforceable right, and the court's execution of a formal piece of paper called





Common law indemnity developed in large part as an exception
to the common law rule which denied the right of contribution be-
tween joint tortfeasors. The common law rejection of contribution
between joint tortfeasors became an integral part of the common
law system which generally predicated liability on the basis of
fault. The main principles of this system as applied to uninten-
tional conduct included the doctrine that a defendant would only
be liable if negligent and that a plaintiff would be barred from re-
covery if contributorily negligent. The rule against contribution
among joint tortfeasors was consistent with this system of liability
based on fault and was a less significant, but still necessary, part of
it.
In cases where a defendant who was not personally at fault was
held liable in tort for a plaintiff's injuries under a rule of law mak-
ing the defendant legally responsible for the torts of another, com-
mon law indemnity could be awarded without fear of contravening
the fault principle underlying the no contribution rule. Where joint
tortfeasors were at fault, however, an express exception to the no
contribution rule had to be recognized in order to allow the less
culpable tortfeasor to shift his loss to the more culpable tortfeasor.
Numerous bases for allowing indemnity in these circumstances can
be found in different jurisdictions. The principal factors used to
allow common law indemnity as an exception to the no contribu-
tion rule were (1) the existence of a duty owing to the indemnitee
from the indemnitor based on some relationship between the par-
ties that pre-existed the third party's injury, (2) the presence of
justifiable reliance in the circumstances of the case, or (3) the dis-
tinction between active and passive negligence.
When Florida adopted a comparative negligence rule in place of
a contributory negligence rule and then shortly thereafter adopted
a Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act allowing
contribution among joint tortfeasors on a comparative fault basis,
the justification ended for allowing exceptions to achieve transfer
in lieu of contribution where both tortfeasors were at fault. The
Houdaille decision quite logically abolishes common law indemnity
in Florida in cases where the party claiming indemnity is at fault.
An exception to the rule in Houdaille should be allowed in favor
of a tortfeasor guilty of ordinary negligence who is held liable for
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damages caused by a co-tortfeasor guilty of intentional wrongdo-
ing. In this situation, the substantial disparity in the culpability of
the two parties, together with the strong moral and social policies
of deterring and punishing intentional misconduct, justify the al-
lowance of indemnity against the intentional tortfeasor. In other
situations, however, common law indemnity should only be al-
lowed, as held in Houdaille, to a party who is not personally at
fault but is held liable for a third person's injuries by some rule of
vicarious, derivative, constructive or technical liability.
Common law indemnity, however, forms only one part of Flor-
ida's law of indemnity. Florida has recognized the rule that as long
as public policy is not violated, parties are free to allocate among
themselves their respective risks of liability by entering into in-
demnification agreements. In the Spring Lock case, the Florida
Supreme Court held that although Florida allows a party to con-
tract for indemnity against his own negligence or strict liability, he
must use "clear and unequivocal" language to evidence his intent,
whether the indemnitee's liability derives from his sole negligence,
his joint negligence with the indemnitor or his strict liability.
The right to receive indemnity against tort claims in Florida has
been modified in some cases by statute. Statutes have been passed
which affect the right to tort indemnity in cases involving con-
struction contracts, corporate indemnity agreements, residential
leases and suits against the state, its agencies and subdivisions.
In cases both of contractual and common law indemnity, the in-
demnitee who prevails is entitled to recover the reasonable attor-
ney's fees and costs incurred in defending the injured third per-
son's suit against him as an element of his damages. He may assert
his claim for indemnity either in an independent action or in the
original action against him by way of cross claim or third party
complaint against the indemnitor. The advantage of asserting his
claim in the original action is that his liability to the primary
claimant and his right to indemnity will be resolved in one action.
If he elects not to implead the indemnitor in the original action,
the indemnitee should consider "vouching in" the indemnitor by
giving him reasonable notice of the third person's suit and request-
ing him to defend the action. If the indemnitee does this, the in-
demnitor will be bound in a subsequent indemnity action by the
judgment entered in the original suit as if he had been a party
insofar as the judgment establishes the indemnitee's liability to the
third person. And, if such notice is given and the request to defend
is made, an indemnitee who settles the original action against him
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will be allowed to satisfy his burden of proving his liability to the
primary claimant in his later suit for indemnity by proving his po-
tential liability to the third person and the reasonableness of the
settlement.
Where the indemnitee has been held liable to the injured third
person the statute of limitation on his claim for indemnity will
generally begin to run when he pays or otherwise satisfies the
liability. Where he has successfully defended the injured third per-
son's suit and wishes to seek indemnity for the reasonable attor-
ney's fees and costs incurred in successfully defending the action,
the statute of limitation will generally begin to run when the in-
jured third person's litigation has ended.
The past decade has been marked by dynamic developments in
the law of indemnity in Florida. This has been fundamentally due
to the substantial economic consequences which are clearly at
stake in the formulation of legal principles governing the allocation
of millions of dollars of tort liability among defendants. Parallel
developments in the related areas of contributory negligence and
contribution among joint tortfeasors have also had a significant im-
pact on the changing law of tort indemnity. The decisions of the
Florida Supreme Court in the Houdaille and Spring Lock cases
marked a major milestone in the advance toward clarity and pre-
dictability in this vital area of law. The present existence of sub-
stantial questions which remain unanswered, however, assures con-
tinued progress toward a coherent and equitable body of tort
indemnity law in Florida.
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